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THE SUPREME COURT'S TRILOGY OF REGULATORY
TAKINGS: KEYSTONE, GLENDALE AND NOLLAN
INTRODUCTION
The concept of property in our society involves a tension between two
competing societal values. As a society, we value private property ownership
and the ability of an individual to own, use and enjoy property in the way he
or she chooses.' This private interest, however, is not absolute and may be
limited by a competing social interest in the property.2 This social interest in
property is typically asserted by the government.3 Asserting public rights may
require that an individual modify his private rights where the two sets of
interests clash.
The government acts as the advocate of societal rights and asserts the social
interest in property through two methods. First, by exercising its power of
eminent domain, the government may appropriate private property for public
projects.4 Second, through the exercise of its police power, the government can
regulate individual conduct which may prove harmful to society. Developing
regulations which allow for a high degree of individual freedom while adequately
protecting the social interest in property involves a delicate balance between
I. L. BECKER, PROPERTY RicitTs: Ptmosoptc FOUNDATIONS 19 (1977). The concept of
property ownership involves the notion of a bundle of rights and certain limitations. The bundle
of rights includes the right to: possess, exclude others, use, manage, and the income or profits
generated. Ownership also includes the power to consume, waste, modify, sell, or alienate the
property, immunity from expropriation by another or the state, and the power to transmit by
gift or devise. Ownership is limited by the term of tenure, i.e. life, a duty not to use the
property to harm others, a liability to execution, and a liability to abandonment. Id.
2. The social interest is illustrated by limitations which are placed on individual property
rights. Specifically, the duty not to use the property to harm others and the property's liability
to execution reflect the interest that the public in general may assert against private property.
Id.
3. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (sustaining New York
Landmark Preservation Act which controlled landmark owner's ability to modify landmark
structure); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (sustaining zoning
ordinance which regulated location of trades, industries, housing, lot sizes and structure heights);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917) (state's authority to pass laws in an exercise of
police power, and to promote public health, safety and welfare, is broad and has been affirmed
in numerous recent court decisions).
4. For a discussion of eminent domain principles see infra notes 58-64 and accompanying
text.
5. For a discussion of the nature of the government's police power see infra notes 72-83
and accompanying text.
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these competing interests in property.6 Achieving this balance has proved
particularly difficult for courts when the challenged government action takes
the form of a land use regulation.
Land use regulation has been characterized as both an act of eminent domain7
and an exercise of the government's police power.' How a regulation is
characterized has a serious impact upon the degree of protection given private
property rights in the face of government action.9 If characterized as an act of
eminent domain, a private property owner is guaranteed just compensation for
his loss.'0 However, if the government regulation is characterized as an exercise
of the police power, the land owner is entitled to have the regulation invalidated
only if it proves unreasonable or arbitrary." Although the fundamental tension
between the competing public and private interests is inherent in the exercise
of both powers, the police power has proven a highly effective vehicle for the
promotion of the social interest in property. Conversely, when the government
action has been classified as an exercise of its eminent domain power, the
judiciary has been highly protective of private interests.
The Supreme Court's treatment of the regulatory takings issue has been less
than definitive. 2 The conflicting characterization of land use regulation has
6. This clash has been characterized as "the classic dilemma of liberal democracy 'in which
political power is envisioned as restrained yet popularly responsive, heedful of the primary
values of private and community choice, yet somehow also reflecting the will of the country."'
Michelman, The Annual John Randolph Tucker Lecture, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097, 1110
(1981) (quoting Michelman, Mr. Justice Brennan: A Property Teacher's Appreciation, 15 H.Av.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 296, 298 (1980)).
7. See infra notes 116-30 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
9. Under the just compensation clause, the property owner is not required to bear the
burden of the public project by himself; the government is required to compensate him justly
for his loss. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 324-25 (1893) (just compensation clause qualifies government's power to take private
property). Traditionally, minimum scrutiny was applied to land use regulation. The standard
often results in great judicial deference to government entities and carries no requirement of
just compensation. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-89 (1926)
(upheld zoning ordinance found to be neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, "although some
industries of an innocent character might fall within the proscribed class"); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887) (benefit to public welfare justified government action banning manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors within state despite fact that it totally deprived property owner
of his business).
10. The just compensation requirement conditions the government's exercise of its eminent
domain power upon the existence of a public purpose. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 241 (1983).
II. The substantive due process analysis, applicable to police power action, requires that
the exercise of police power be justified by some public purpose and not be overly oppressive.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1915) (police power may not be exercised
arbitrarily, however, this is the only limitation on one of the government's most essential
powers).
12. The Court declared in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124




caused much confusion. 3 While declaring that a regulation may constitute a
taking under principles of eminent domain, indicating that the just compen-
sation requirement would automatically be triggered, the Court has developed
a due process analysis which incorporates a deferential posture toward govern-
ment regulation and fails to mandate just compensation. 4 Moreover, in those
cases where the compensation requirement has been triggered, the Court has
not adequately addressed the issue of how to determine the amount of com-
pensation which should be paid to a land owner aggrieved by land use
regulation.
This Comment will identify the relevant concepts involved in the area of
regulatory takings and review the case law that has developed. The Comment
will then present a discussion of the analysis and impact of the Supreme Court's
most recent holdings dealing with this issue: Keystone Bituminous Coal Asso-
ciation v. DeBenedictis;u First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles;' 6 and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.' 7
Finally, this Comment will identify the weaknesses in the Court's analyses in
light of the social policies implicated by regulatory takings.
I. UNDERLYING CONcEPTs
A. Philosophical Foundations
The concept of property ownership in our society is based on a set of legally
defined and enforceable relationships. 8 These relationships exist between an
individual and society, or an individual and the state as the representative of
society, and define each party's respective rights with regard to property.' 9
Ownership is thought to encompass a "bundle" of these rights.20 The right to
use the property, the right to manage the property, and the right to exclude
others are a few of the "sticks" in the "bundle. ' 2 ' Although the rights of use,
possession, and management suggest a superior claim by one individual as
against the claims of society or its individual members," the superior claim is
not without limitations. Indeed, individual rights can be modified or abrogated
by the assertion of competing rights on which society places a higher value. 23
13. See infra notes 106-79 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 203-35 and accompanying text.
15. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
16. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
17. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
18. Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WAsH. L. REv. 583,
589 (1981).
19. Id.
20. See supra note 1 (listing rights in bundle).
21. See supra note 1.
22. These rights imply their negative. The right to possess implies the right to exclude
others. The rights to use and manage imply control of the type of use made of the property
relative to others members of society.
23. See supra note 3.
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Typically, the government is the arbiter of the competing public and private
property interests.? Through regulations and ordinances the government limits
the landowner's action with respect to his property." The government action
is justified as an assertion of societal fights.2 Furthermore, when public need
for private property arises, the government may exercise its eminent domain
power and physically take the property.27
There are two major philosophical theories regarding the appropriate scope
of governmental powers with respect to private property.2 These theories
represent two points on a continuum for which absolute private ownership and
absolute social ownership serve as the extreme poles. John Locke's dominion
theory of limited government represents the point on the continuum where
private rights take preeminence over social rights.? Thomas Hobbes' social
24. There are mechanisms through which private parties regulate the behavior of property
owners in relation to their property. Restrictive covenants enable private parties to balance the
interest of an individual against the interests of a particular social group. The restrictive covenant
acts as a mechanism to control the acts of individual property owners for the benefit of the
group. This mechanism is frequently employed in residential development plans. The developer
includes the covenant in the contract for sale and the covenant is legally enforceable against
the individual homeowner by the residential group or the developer. Stoebuck, Running Cov-
enants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. Rav. 861, 907-18 (1977).
25. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (sustaining New
York Landmark Preservation Act which controlled landmark owner's ability to modify landmark
structure); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (sustaining zoning
ordinance which regulated location of trades, industries, housing, lot sizes and structure heights).
26. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (governmental power to interfere
with property rights by zoning regulation is not unlimited; such restrictions cannot be imposed
if not justified by need to protect public health, safety, morals and welfare); Village of Euclid,
272 U.S. at 387 (land use regulations and ordinances "must find their justification in some
aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare"); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 410-14 (1915) (upholding ordinance which prohibited maintenance of petitioner's business
because ordinance was enacted to protect health, safety and comfort of community).
27. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1983) (Court upheld state's
exercise of eminent domain power to break up concentration of land in small portion of
population and redistribute title among general populace); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S.
513, 518 (1883) (eminent domain is power to take private property for public use); Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 894, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (Detroit justified in
condemning community residents' land through eminent domain power in order to transfer title
to General Motors Corporation because of public need for community's economic revitalization).
28. See supra notes 31-53 & accompanying text. See generally Dowling, General Propositions
and Concrete Cases: The Search for a Standard in the Conflict Between Individual Property
Rights and the Social Interest, 1 J. LAND UsE & ENmL. L. 353 (1985); Oakes, supra note 18
at 583-87; Pilon, Property Rights, Takings and a Free Society, 6 HAxv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'VY
165 (1983).
29. See Oakes, supra note 18, at 584. Under Locke's theory, property is an aspect of an
individual's personality and, as such, something which he posseses exclusive of the rights of
others. Therefore, the government is obligated to pay a high degree of deference to private
property ownership. See also BECKER, supra note 1, at 8 (under Locke's theory, property rights
are not derived from the sovereign and, therefore, the sovereign must respect private rights of
ownership).
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view is at the other end of the continuum and requires a total subjugation of
private rights to the social interest3 0
1. The dominion theory
Under John Locke's philosophy of limited government, an individual sur-
renders certain rights to the sovereign to allow the sovereign to maintain social
order." Locke believed that social order benefits all members of society because
it establishes a stable and secure environment in which man can pursue
individual fulfillment.- However, just as ownership rights are not absolute,
under this philosophy, an individual does not absolutely surrender his property
rights to the sovereign. A sovereign may impair individual rights only to the
extent necessary to effect its order-keeping function. 33 Because a sovereign
derives its power from society, its needs must be justified and defined in
reference to the needs of the members of society.34 Thus, the scope of the
sovereign's power is restricted, and the sovereign may not enhance its own
position at the expense of an individual or the general populace. 3 The concept
of limited sovereign power is designed to protect against tyranny.36 In the
context of property law, this philosophical view is reflected in the "dominion"
theory of property rights. 37
The "dominion" theory of property traces its roots to Lockean philosophy
and reflects the view that the sovereign's power in relation to private property
rights is highly limited in scope.33 Society endows the sovereign with the power
to impair individual rights only when necessary to preserve order. This premise
suggests a hierarchy in which an individual's property rights typically take
30. BECKER, supra note 1, at 8.
31. J. LoCKE, OF C,'x GOVERNMENT, ch. I § 3 (1690). For a critique of the Lockean
philosophy of government and the government's relationship to private property rights, see
generally BECKER, supra note 1, at 170-75; R. EPsTEN, TAKiNaS: PRIvATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF E NETer DoMAtN 7-17 (Harv. Univ. Press 1985).
32. EPsTEN, supra note 31, at 12-13.
33. According to Locke, the state as sovereign does not have the power to create new rights
for itself to take property merely because it desires to do so. The government's powers are only
as extensive as its objective of protecting the members of society demands. Governmental power
is "but the joint power of every member of society given up to that person or assembly, which
is legislator. .. ." LOCKE, supra note 31, § 135. Therefore, a sovereign's powers do not exceed
those of the collective members of society. "Every transaction between the state and the
individual can thus be understood as a transaction between private individuals, some of whom
have the mantle of sovereignty while others do not." EPsTErN, supra note 31, at 13.
34. See supra note 33.
35. Under Locke's theory, the government is precluded from taking gains for itself because
every exercise of power is justified by societal needs and, theoretically, the benefits of the
action are distributed among the members of society and no excess gain is retained by the
government. EPsmm, supra note 31, at 10.
36. Lockean theory holds that a government which retains no excess wealth or power for
itself will not have the means to assert monpoly power. Id.
37. Oakes, supra note 18, at 584.
38. Id.
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precedence over the government's power to interfere with those property rights.
Under this theory, the exercise of government power carries with it a difficult
burden of justification." Indeed, under this view property rights are charac-
terized as "civil rights" and are thought to deserve the same degree of legal
protection as other "personal liberties." 4
2. Social view
At the other end of the spectrum is the anti-property rights theory or the
Hobbesian philosophy.41 According to Thomas Hobbes, the individual must
surrender all personal liberty and property rights to the sovereign in exchange
for the maintenance of social order.42 Hobbes believed that without a highly
structured society man would deteriorate into a state of perpetual war where
survival is the only right.4 One of the stronger arguments supporting an anti-
property theory is that state enforcement of individual property rights perpet-
uates inequality." Inequality occurs because those individuals with the most
"liberty" or "property" also have the economic means with which to keep
these advantages for themselves and their heirs.4 This exclusive possession is
protected by the sovereign through the legal and economic systems of the
society.46 Those who have no property rights have no rights to pass on and no
rights requiring legal protection. 47 The potential problem with this system is
39. Under the dominion theory, property rights are characterized as civil rights. This suggests
that the role of the sovereign is that of the protector of the individual and the individual's
ability to assert his civil rights. An individual's property rights fall into this category and are,
under this theory, deserving of as high a degree of legal protection as other civil rights receive.
See Oakes, supra note 18, at 586; Pilon, supra note 28, at 170.
40. Justice Stewart in Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), stated that
"[p]roperty does not have rights, people have rights ... a fundamental interdependence exists
between the personal rights to liberty and the personal right to property. Neither could have
meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been
recognized." Id. at 552.
41. Thomas Hobbes, like John Locke, saw the government's principal function as that of
creating and maintaining social order. If man was left to his natural state, Hobbes believed
society would deteriorate into a state of war. This state of chaos would be caused by man's
natural selfishness and aggressiveness. Unlike Locke, Hobbes believed that nothing less than a
total surrender of individual rights would ensure stability. T. HonaEs, LEVIATIUN ch. 13 (1651).
For a discussion of the political theory of Hobbes and other "anti.property" theories see
BECKER, supra note 1, at 88-98; EPsTEIn, supra note 31, at 7-18 ; Pilon, supra note 28, at 175-
78.
42. Hobbes, supra note 41, at ch. 13.
43. Id.
44. BECKER, supra note 1, at 96.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. A similar "anti-property" argument is one which Becker labels the concept of "social
disutility," which concerns inequitable distribution of wealth and the social, as opposed to the
individual, impact of this distribution. Essentially, this is the focus of the Hobbes philosophy.
In addition to the individual and social ramifications of inequitable property distribution, Becker
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that the sovereign's conduct is unconstrained. The desire to avoid revolution
is the only incentive for limiting its power, and therefore, the potential for
tyrannical behavior by the sovereign is great.48
The "social" view of property rights reflects the Hobbesian philosophy.49
Under this theory, the government has a broad scope of power relative to
private property. Property owned by individuals is thought to be held in a
"public trust" for the benefit of society. 0 Society is the ultimate beneficiary
and the landowner is the trustee whose actions are limited by the needs and
desires of the beneficiary.' In addition to maintaining the social order, the
government, on behalf of society, may interfere with private property rights
for a wide variety of reasons. This theory supports a hierarchy where "social
welfare" takes precedence over private rights.52 Accordingly, private property
interests are afforded little legal protection. 3
B. Methods For Government Assertion Of The Social Right To Property
There are two ways in which a government entity can assert social rights
over private property: through the exercise of its eminent domain power;-4 or,
through the exercise of its police power." Under our constitutional framework,
cites two other anti-property arguments.
1. A system of private property ownership is self-defeating where a finite quantum
of property exists and is held by a certain group of owners. Other individuals
will be foreclosed from ownership. This result contradicts the system of property
rights which ensure an individual the fruits of his labor. Under this system if
an individual works and produces something, that thing becomes the laborer's
property. Where another owns the property which another produces, the indi-
vidual is not necessarily guaranteed his rights of ownership. For example when
a farm worker produces vegetables, these vegetables belong to the farmer, the
ultimate property owner, and not to the worker. The system breaks down
because the worker is precluded under the theory from obtaining what is
rightfully his under the theory.
2. Private ownership produces vicious character traits such as greed and posses-
siveness. Plato was an advocate of this argument.
BEcKER, supra note 1, at ch. 8.
48. EpsnmN, supra note 31, at 8. The government, given broad unchecked powers, "will
act like any other monopolist whose conduct is left unconstrained. His laws and rules will
expropriate most of the benefits of political union by allowing each individual member only
the minimum inducement to remain quiescent." Id.
49. See Oakes, supra note 18, at 586. The advocates of this theory have advanced different
justifications for their support. Oakes discussed the Jeffersonian adaptation, which focused on
promoting individual social and economic equality as an end in itself. Becker discussed Plato's
theory that private property ownership adversely effects character. BECICER, supra note I, at
96. However, the premise of the argument is that all property is subject to the superior claim
of the collective society in order to obtain social stability. HOBES, supra note 41, at ch. 13.
50. Oakes, supra note 18, at 587.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Pilon, supra note 28, at 175-76.
54. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
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the fifth amendment's just compensation clause limits and defines the scope
of the government's eminent domain power.5 6 The government's exercise of its
police power is constrained by the fifth amendment's substantive due process
clause.."
1. Eminent domain
The concept of eminent domain applies when a government entity seeks to
appropriate private property for public use .5  The government's power to
exercise eminent domain is not explicitly granted in the United States Consti-
tution, but has been held to be an inherent attribute of sovereignty. 9 Never-
theless, the fifth amendment limits a government's exercise of this power in
two ways. First, property may be appropriated only when justified by a public
use.60 Second, just compensation must be paid to the individual landowner for
property that is taken. 61 To acquire property, a government entity typically
institutes a condemnation proceeding 1 in which "just compensation," generally
measured by the market value of the property, is calculated and paid to the
property owner.61 When a government entity initiates condemnation proceedings
the legal issues implicated by the fifth amendment are relatively clear. A tangible
taking of property has occurred and compensation is mandated."
56. 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EduwENT Domnw, § 1.3 (3rd ed. 1985).
57. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (applying standard test of substantive due
process to police power regulation). The doctrine of substantive due process is a manifestation
of the constitutional limitations on the government's exercise of its police power. A regulation
will be deemed invalid if found to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Stoebuck, Police
Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1980). See generally
Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory Takings," 8 HAsT I Gs
CoNST. L.Q. 517 (1981).
58. The text of the fifth amendment provides "nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This clause has been held to
incorporate the requirements of public use and just compensation. See Kohl v. United States,
91 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1875) (requirements of just compensation and public purpose implied in
fifth amendment). These requirements have been held applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
59. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 56, § 1.14.
60. See supra note 10.
61. The fifth amendment's just compensation clause provides: "nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (condemnation proceeding
serves to vest title in condemnor pursuant to a taking).
63. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (full and just equivalent required by
constitution generally held to be market value of property at time of taking). For an extensive
discussion on valuation methods see 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EmINENT
DoMAiN, § 11-127 (2d ed. 1953).
64. See supra note 58. For further discussion of the principles of eminent domain see
EPsTEN, supra note 31 (book extensively covers the concepts of government and property and





In cases where the government takes property without instituting a condem-
nation proceeding, the property owner has a cause of action under the fifth
amendment. 65 This is called an action in inverse condemnation and is available
because the fifth amendment is held to be self-executing. 6 When a government
entity has taken private property for public use without instituting a condem-
nation proceeding, the inverse condemnation cause of action provides for just
compensation as a remedy.67
Inverse condemnation was first applied in cases where government action
resulted in physical invasion of private property. Courts have had no difficulty
applying the requirements of the fifth amendment to these factual scenarios
because physical interference with private property by the government has
historically implicated the just compensation clause.e The doctrine has since
expanded and courts now recognize that other types of government action may
implicate this cause of action. The inverse condemnation cause of action is
applied where government action destroys or impairs access to and from
property.70 Land use regulation enacted by a government entity with the
65. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (when government takes property,
but fails to initiate condemnation proceedings, property owner may bring inverse condemnation
action).
66. Clarke, 445 U.S. at 257; 3 P. NICHOLS, supra note 56, § 8.112] (when private property
has been taken or damaged for public use, the self-executing nature of fifth amendment just
compensation clause provides a basis for action, regardless of whether government has instituted
condemnation proceedings).
67. 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 56, § 6.21 (discussing nature and origins of inverse condem-
nation remedy.
68. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (13 Wall. 1871) (flooding of land caused by
government constituted a taking for which inverse condemnation action was applicable); Sin-
nickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129 (1839) (action to recover for damages from flooding of
land caused by state authorized erection of dam).
69. 3 P. NICHOLS, supra note 56, § 8.1[4]. Nichols traces the evolution of the inverse
condemnation remedy. Inverse condemnation originated as a remedy for government action
which physically interfered with private property for public use but where condemnation
proceedings were not initiated by the government entity. Id. The remedy was initially limited
to those cases where the interference directly implicated the traditional notion of the extent of
the eminent domain powers of the government. Id. The remedy has since been expanded to
encompass situations where the impaired property interest is not one which the government
could have initiated condemnation proceedings to acquire. Id. The cases which hold that
government interference with ingress and egress may implicate an action in inverse condemnation
illustrate the development. The property interest destroyed, the ability to access property, is
not one that a government entity would acquire through condemnation proceedings. Id. Even
those cases requiring the payment of compensation which depart the farthest from the eminent
domain model, still involve some sort of physical interference with property. Id.
70. McCall Serv. Stations, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 390, 524 P.2d 1165
(1974) (city improvement impaired access to property and owner compensated). See also 2 P.
NICHOLS, supra note 56, § 6.21131 (recovery in inverse condemnation may be obtained where
mere impairment of the right to access constitutes a taking).
1989]
450 DEPA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:441
intention of depressing the value of property in contemplation of appropriation
also gives rise to an action in inverse condemnation.7' 1
3. Police power
Unlike the physical appropriation of private property for public use, land
use regulation typically is characterized as an exercise of the government's
police power and not as an exercise of the government's eminent domain
power. 7 The government exercises its police power in order to advance the
public welfare. 7 1 The concepts and policies involved in police power actions
parallel those implicated by the eminent domain power. In both exercises of
power the government is acting on behalf of society and a genuine public
purpose is required as justification for the action.74 However, if government
action is characterized as an exercise of its police power, the action traditionally
has been subject to review under the substantive due process clause as opposed
to the just compensation clause invoked by courts where the action is one in
eminent domain.7 1
The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides that no person shall
"be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 7 6 Analysis
under due process, like that under the just compensation clause, seeks to
balance public and private interests. A valid exercise of the police power will
incorporate a proper balance of these interests.*n Under the due process analysis
71. Robertson v. City of Salem, 191 F. Supp. 604 (D. Or. 1961) (ordinance established to
depress land in contemplation of condemnation held void as a taking): Peacock v. County of
Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969) (allowed inverse condemnation
action where government adopted height restrictions on subdivision in contemplation of building
airport in area and restrictions impaired plaintiff's development of his property).
72. The extent to which government may regulate private property is an issue which has
been addressed in terms of the scope of police power. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) ("The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations,
must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public
welfare."); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (police power and eminent domain powers
are different in kind and a regulation may never constitute a taking); R. CUNNWGHAM, W.
STOEBUCK & D. WMHTMAN, Tim LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.2 (1984) (stale governments regulate
land use pursuant to police power and may delegate power to local governments); Dowling,
supra note 28, at 365 (police power concept encompasses classic conflict between private and
social interest in property).
73. See supra note 3.
74. See supra note 58 for a discussion of the fifth amendment requirement of a public
purpose in order to justify a taking. Similarly, the police power is defined in terms of public
purpose. "The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... It is within the power
of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (citation omitted).
75. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (ordinance evaluated under substantive
due process and equal protection); Mugler v. Kansas, 12 U.S. 623 (1887) (oppressive regulation
must be challenged through substantive due process and may never constitute a taking).
76. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
77. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). Lawton set out the classic substantive due process
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a regulation will be considered valid where it seeks to provide a public benefit
and is implemented in such a way as to logically achieve this objective without
causing excessive deprivation to individuals. In practice, this test has focused
on the public benefit and, once a public benefit is found, a property owner
must abide by the regulation despite the degree of oppressiveness. 78 Because
the due process analysis focuses on a showing of a public benefit and gives
little weight to the negative impact on the individual property owner, this
doctrine tends to be highly protective of the public interest in property. 79
Ironically, the two different types of governmental actions which seek to
accomplish similar goals and are restrained by similar policies are subject to
scrutiny under two distinct sets of legal criteria. Where the government exercises
its eminent domain power to physically appropriate property pursuant to a
public purpose, just compensation is mandated.Y° The judiciary historically has
guaranteed just compensation to the landowner under a physical interference
scenario.' However, the courts treat regulatory actions quite differently. 2 They
have not afforded landowners the same protection against land use regulation
as they have against physical appropriation.8
4. American legal history
The Supreme Court has attempted to balance the public and private property
interests implicated in land use regulation by a number of different methods."
test and incorporated elements which reflect public and private interests. "To justify the State
.. interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of
the public . . . require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals." Id. at
137.
78. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upheld zoning ordinance which put
petitioner's brickyard out of business); Mugler, 123 U.S. 623 (upheld regulation despite almost
total destruction of petitioner's business).
79. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926) (upheld
zoning ordinance as neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, "although some industries of an
innocent character might fall within the proscribed class"); Mugler, 123 U.S. 623 (found that
benefit to public welfare justified government action despite fact that action totally deprived
property owner of business).
80. See supra note 58.
81. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (government's imposition of
navigational servitude on private marina required compensation to be paid to owners); Mon-
ongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) (government's acquisition of
privately owned lock and dam constituted a taking and compensation awarded); Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (13 Wall. 1871) (flooding of land by backwater of state constructed
dam required compensation despite no disturbance of title).
82. See supra note 78.
83. The results of cases adjudicated under the substantive due process clause and the takings
clause differ. In Mugler, even though the regulation caused a total destruction of the plaintiff's
business, it was found to be a proper exercise of police power, and therefore, no compensation
was due. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). In an eminent domain scenario, the government initiates
condemnation proceedings to physically take property and compensation is mandated by the
fifth amendment of the constitution. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1875).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 54-83.
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The degree of judicial protection of property rights, reflecting popular attitude,
has shifted throughout history. Early in this country's history, the Supreme
Court struggled to find some authority with which to challenge state legislation
that adversely affected private property.5 The Constitution provided limited
restraints on state power, yet, the states were responsible for promulgating
most of the regulations which impaired private property rights." The Court
initially found some assistance in the contract clause of the United States
Constitution.8 Two early cases, Fletcher v. Pecle and The Trustees of Dart-
mouth College v. Woodward,89 illustrate the Court's reliance on the sanctity
of contract to protect individual rights from state impairment." However, this
tool's application was limited to situations where a contract was found to exist.
Shortly thereafter, the notion of state police power, justified by the necessity
of protecting the public welfare, developed in the United States.9' This ever-
broadening concept further limited the court's ability to maintain control over
the states. 92 However, with the adoption of the Civil War Amendments in the
1860's the Court obtained a new method of control through substantive due
process. 93
85. R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWACK, J. YouNo, TREATISE ON CONSTrrunoNA LAW SUBSTANCE
& PROCEDURE § 15.1 (1986) [hereinafter R. RoTUNDA].
86. Id.
87. Oakes, supra note 18, at 590.
88. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (6 Cranch 1810).
89. The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (4 Wheat. 1819).
90. In Fletcher, the Court held that the contract clause prohibited a state legislature from
rescinding a state grant of land. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 139. The Dartmouth case concerned an
attempt by the New Hampshire legislature to gain control of the college through the appointment
of additional trustees not provided for in Dartmouth's charter. The Court held that this
legislative action would violate the charter which established the school. Dartmouth, 17 U.S.
at 712. See also New Jersey v. Wilson, II U.S. 164 (7 Cranch 1812) (Court struck down New
Jersey law which repealed land related tax exemption established by colonial legislature).
91. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (11 Pet. 1837). The plaintiff argued
that the state's authority over the construction of a competing bridge impaired the plaintiff's
state created charter. Id. at 429. The Court acknowledged that the government's action abridged
the charter, but upheld the action on the grounds that the legislature must act to provide for
the welfare of its citizens, and that the public need might at times supercede an individual's
contractual rights. Id. at 542.
92. The concept of police power both broadened the power of the legislature and impaired
the court's ability to control state action through the contract clause. Essentially, police power
was thought to supersede contractual rights. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 547-48. See also
Oakes, supra note 18, at 590-94 (noting end of Court's use of contract clause to control state
regulation in Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (where Court read
into all contracts "the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power"); R. ROTUnDA,
supra note 85, § 15.1 (citing demise of Court's control over state legislation through contract
clause).
93. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). These cases mark the beginning of the Court's use of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause to scrutinize and control state legislation.
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Initially, the Court was reluctant to actively invoke the new amendments
and distanced itself from post-war political sentiment. 94 Over time, however,
due to the growth of industry and the proliferation of state legislation regu-
lating industry, the Court found it necessary to mediate the conflict between
state government and industry. 9' Applying substantive due process standards,
the Court reviewed state regulation of land use under a subjective "reasona-
bleness" criterion. A regulation reasonably calculated to achieve a public
purpose satisfied this test. The presiding judge was given discretion to define
"reasonableness." This mode of protection against state impairment of prop-
erty interests continued into the early twentieth century. 96
During the rise of the substantive due process doctrine, the notion that a
land use regulation could constitute a taking pursuant to eminent domain
principles was introduced. 97 Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon was the genesis of this concept98 and the subsequent confusion that
dominates the Court's treatment of land use regulation. The notion that a
land use regulation could constitute a taking never fully developed as a legal
theory and this intensified the Court's confused approach to land use regu-
lation. This lack of development, due in part to the political changes that
occurred in the 1930's, triggered a period of judicial passivity. 99
A dramatic shift in the Court's approach to controlling economic regulation
occurred in response to President Roosevelt's court packing plan."'* During
the depression, President Roosevelt developed a scheme for intensive govern-
ment regulation of industry. 0' Anticipating the Court's negative reaction to
his plans, the President threatened to disrupt the entire structure of the Court
and undermine its power by placing nine additional justices on the Court.1°e
In response, the Court adopted a nonactivist stance with regard to economic
regulation and, as a result, private property rights zuccumbed to state regu-
94. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (16 Wall. 1872). In Slaughter-House, the Court
refused to construe the post war amendments as having any purpose beyond establishing the
freedom of the newly-made free man and protecting him from oppression. The Court was also
reluctant to upset the balance of federal-state relations by interpreting and applying the post-
war amendments as an open ended grant of federal power. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 85, at §
15.2. See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (upheld state's power to regulate grain
storage industry because of public interest).
95. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 85, § 15.2. See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(struck down state law limiting number of hours per week that bakery employee could work
as infringement on freedom of contract); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (Court
held that state statute which nullified insurance policies if the insurance company had not
complied with state law was invalid because it deprived the insured of liberty without due
process of law).
96. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 85, at § 15.3.
97. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
98. Id.
99. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 85, at §§ 15.4, 15.12.
100. Id. at §§ 15.3, 15.4.
101. Id. at 15.3.
102. Id.
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latory schemes.'1 The general trend of intensive state land use regulation and
judicial deference in the economic regulatory sphere continues and reflects the
current judicial approach to land use regulation.'' 4
The next section will present the two relevant constitutional doctrines ap-
plicable to land use regulation, the takings doctrine and the substantive due
process doctrine. The section will then explore the principal tests under each
doctrine which are designed to discover an imbalance between the public and
private interests in property. These two doctrines represent the foundations of
judicial analysis regarding land use regulation and are the roots of the con-
fusion in this area of the law.1os
II. DOCTRiNAL FouNDA'xONS
A. Substantive Due Process
The case of Mugler v. Kansase6 is the quintessential substantive due process
case in the area of land use regulation. The state of Kansas enacted a regulation
that prohibited Mugler, the owner of a beer brewery, from the manufacture,
103. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the Court sustained a state
minimum wage law for women as a legitimate exercise of the states police power. Just 14 years
earlier, the Court had struck down a state statute which set a minimum wage for women on
the ground that the statute impaired freedom of contract. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923). See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (Court hypoth-
esized reasons state legislature might have had for enacting statute and found hypothetical
reasons sufficient to provide basis for sustaining statute); United States v. Caroline Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938) (Court deferred to legislature and stated that any reasonably assumed facts
could provide support for statute).
104. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (open space zoning regulation that
limited development to one single family residence per acre was reasonable exercise of police
power); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (New York Landmark
Preservation Commission's limitation of building rights on certain property to promote aesthetic
preservation was reasonable exercise of police power).
Even the regulatory scenarios in which the Supreme Court has found a taking involve some
aspect of physical invasion. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), a developer
converted a pond into a marina and dug channels which provided access from the marina to
the ocean. The government claimed that the marina and channels constituted a "navigable
waterway" and were therefore subject to public use. Id. at 170. The Court held that the
government had taken the developer's property by converting the marina into a federal navi-
gational servitude. Id. at 178. The servitude that the government created was analogous to the
taking of an easement. Id. at 180. An easement is a legally recognized property interest which
involves a transfer of rights for a limited use of the property. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §
450 (1944). In Kaiser Aetna, the limited use involved physical invasion of the marina. Because
the Court could easily define what was taken in standard property terms, i.e., an easement.
and could point to a physical invasion, this case created none of the difficult problems of pure
regulatory interference. Similarly, in Causby v. United States, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the Court
found that the military's flight paths over the plaintiff's property constituted a taking. As in
Kaiser Aetna, these facts can be construed as the taking of an easement and the factor of
physical invasion is apparent.
105. Stoebuck, supra note 57, at 1057.
106. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages. Having no alternative use for the
property, the owner brought suit asserting that the government action consti-
tuted a taking. The Court held that the government action was a valid exercise
of the state's police power and, therefore, could not constitute a taking of
property for which compensation was due.1t 7 The Court stated that when
justified by a public interest, a prohibition on the uses to which a parcel of
property may be put would never implicate the takings clause."'4
The Court suggested that a landowner had a potential cause of action
based on an improper exercise of the police power under a substantive due
process analysis. 9 The Court noted that the legislature might enact a statute
which had no real or substantial relation to the public interest upon which
it was justified. In that case, the statute could be invalidated as an improper
exercise of the state's police power." 0 However, if the exercise of police
power was valid, a property owner could never recover despite the amount
of loss he incurred as a result of the regulation."' Thus, the Court viewed
the difference between the police power and the eminent domain power as
one in "kind" and not one of "degree."" 2
Subsequent cases clarified the substantive due process analysis in its ap-
plication to land use regulation. The classic test is laid out in Lawton v.
Steele."' The three part test which evolved required that: 1) the state show
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
specific parties, require such interference; 2) the means employed must be
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose; and, 3) the means not be
unduly oppressive on the individual property owner. 14 The "reasonableness"
standard used in this test indicates that the Lawton Court applied a minimum
degree of scrutiny. The use of this "reasonableness" standard has resulted
in great judicial deference to regulatory entities.'
B. The Taking Theory
The theory that a land use regulation may constitute a de facto taking
was first articulated in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon." 6 Pennsylvania Coal
involved the Kohler Act (the "Act"), which prohibited "the mining of
107. Id. at 668-69.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 661.
110. Id.
11I. Id. at 668.
112. Id. at 669. "The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is
itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value
becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use." Id.
113. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
114. Id. at 136-37.
115. The substantive due process tests have been consistently condemned because they allow
for a great deal of judicial subjectivity and judicial involvement in matters considered to be of
legislative concern. However, at least in the sphere of land use regulation, courts have been
unwilling to encroach on legislative judgment, and therefore, a great degree of deference has
arisen when the tests have been applied. See generally R. ROTUNDA, supra note 85, at § 15.3.
116. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of, among other
things, any structure used as a human habitation.. . ." "17 The plaintiff
had purchased a home and the surface rights to the land on which the home
sat."' The coal company retained the right to mine the coal underneath." 9
In this contractual arrangement, the homeowner assumed the risk of subsi-
dence of the land on which his home sat.10 Years after the agreement, the
Kohler Act came into effect and the homeowner brought suit to enjoin the
coal company from further mining under his home.' The coal company
claimed that the Act was unconstitutional because it deprived the company
of its property rights and interfered with its freedom to contract.1'"
In his analysis, Justice Holmes applied a balancing test which used the
same factors the Court had applied in the substantive due process cases.'"
However, Justice Holmes gave less weight to the public purpose factor and
focused instead on the degree of loss element.' 2' Holmes analyzed the "public
use" factor and concluded that the injury implicated by the statute was "not
common or public" and, therefore, could not be justified for safety rea-
sons.'"1 The critical factor in his analysis was the extent of the diminution
in value of the property rights of the coal company.'2 6 The Court held that
117. Id. at 412-13.




122. Id. at 394-95.
123. Id. at 413-14. The Court evaluated the regulation in terms of its public purpose and
the extent of the diminution in value of the property. Id. at 414-16. However, the Court focused
on the diminution in value, which the Mugler Court termed the "oppressiveness of the means"
and held that despite a public purpose, if the diminution in value was found to be great, a
taking would be found. Id. The Court in Pennsylvania Coal stated that "[tlhe general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking." ld. at 415.
124. "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change." 260 U.S. at 416.
125. Id. at 413. Holmes stated that the conflict was between two private interests and that
the public interest was minimal. He rejected the notion that the public interest in safety could
justify the statute. The statute could satisfy public safety by requiring notice to those adversely
affected by subsidence. Id. at 414.
Holmes' treatment of the substantive due process analytical factors was the origin of the
confusion in this area of law. Holmes stated that where a landowner's loss is great, the
regulation causing the deprivation will be deemed a taking despite the existence of a public
purpose. Id. at 415. While the analysis suggested a disregard of the public purpose factor where
the degree of loss was excessive, the case could be interpreted as a substantive due process case
where the public purpose failed to justify the regulation. However, in his factual analysis,
Holmes found a "limited" public purpose. Id. at 413.
126. The Court stated that to determine the proper limits of the police power "[olne fact
for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act." 260 U.S. at 413. See also Stoebuck, supra note 57, at 1064
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"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking" and invalidated the Act. 27 The Court
also stated that the distinction between the eminent domain power and the
police power was one of "degree" and not one in "kind." n
Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal created confusion in two
ways. First, the Court held that when diminution in property value, due to
regulation, "reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."' 2 9
However, the Court did not provide a clear standard to determine when a
regulation becomes a taking. Second, after stating that the regulation con-
stituted a taking for which compensation must be paid, the Court simply
invalidated the regulation without deciding whether compensation was due
for the interim period in which the coal company was unable to mine and
deprived of the use of its property." 0 If the Act constituted a taking, it
would logically follow that a temporary taking occurred during the interim
period and, therefore, compensation was owed to the property owner.
The confusion in this area of the law stems not only from the unreconciled
doctrines of substantive due process and eminent domain, but also from
internal inconsistencies within the takings analysis applied by Justice Holmes.
From this confusion evolved an assortment of related tests. These tests
illustrate the Court's attempts to formulate criteria to determine where a
regulation ends and a taking begins.
C. Related Tests
1. Noxious use
The noxious use test is a variation on the themes of substantive due process
and the law of nuisance."' The test is premised on the substantive due
(stating that "[indeed, Holmes in [Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.] Mahon seems to have been
concerned largely with the coal company's loss of value.").
127. 260 U.S. at 415.
128. Id. at 416.
129. Id. at 413.
130. Id. at 416. If the case is interpreted as one in which the public purpose was insufficient
to justify government exercise of police power, invalidation as a remedy is doctrinally consistent.
See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). In the Fred French case, the court rejected
the notion that police power action could constitute a taking. The court dealt with the language
of Pennsyhania Coal by characterizing that language as a metaphor:
The metaphor should not be confused with the reality. Close examination of the
cases reveals that in none of them, anymore than in the Pennsylvania Coal case
... was there an actual 'taking' under the eminent domain power, despite the use
of the terms 'taking' or 'confiscatory.' Instead, in each, the gravamen of the
constitutional challenge to the regulatory measure was that it was an invalid exercise
of the police power under the due process clause, and the cases were decided under
that rubric.
Id. at 594-95, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385 N.Y.S. 2d at 9 (citations omitted).
131. See Stoebuck, supra note 57, at 1061-62.
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process concept that an exercise of police power which seeks to promote
public health, safety, and welfare is a valid government act and does not
require compensation despite the degree of deprivation. 133 By declaring a
particular use of land inimical to the public health and welfare, the regulation
is thought to create a nuisance at law.' Courts typically apply a substantive
due process analysis, modified by a presumption of reasonableness, when
they find that a harmful use exists. "A
Courts have applied a low level of scrutiny to legislation which regulates
a noxious use.'35 In Goldblatt v. Hempstead,16 the Court reviewed a regu-
lation which prohibited a sand and gravel company from excavating below
the water table. The plaintiffs contended that the ordinance prevented them
from continuing their business and constituted a taking of property. 137 The
Court's analysis was extremely deferential to the regulating entity. While
stating that "[a] careful examination of the record reveals a dearth of relevant
evidence . . ." supporting the existence of the menace which the regulation
is thought to abate,' 38 and finding no indication that the plaintiff's activities
created an actual danger to the public, 139 the Court upheld the ordinance.
The Court held that the sand and gravel company had not demonstrated
that the ordinance was unreasonable, excessive or unduly burdensome and,
therefore, the ordinance should stand.' 40 Under the Goldblatt analysis, where
a regulating body can identify a "harmful" use of land as the object of the
restriction, courts have come close to finding the regulation valid per se.
2. "Too Far" test
Pennsylvania Coal serves as precedent for the "too far" test. Under this
test, the distinction between a regulation which constitutes an exercise of the
The noxious-use test is a false test of whether a taking has occurred. It is in fact
a test of whether the regulatory measure addresses a problem that the government
might legitimately try to solve. That is, the test actually focuses on whether the
regulatory measure was lacking in substantive due process.
Id. at 1062.
132. Id. at 1061-62.
133. The Court in Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915), held that a livery stable,
while not a nuisance per se, could legitimately be declared a nuisance in fact and in law, where
the existence of the business adversely affected the public. Id. at 176. See also Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (held brickyard, which was not a nuisance per se, was nonetheless
a nuisance at law where legislation found brickyard inimical to public health).
134. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The Court in Hempstead
upheld the ordinance although it found that the town had not produced any evidence which
indicated the plaintiff's use of their land posed any actual danger to the public. Id. at 595.
135. "Traditionally the courts have given great weight to regulations designed to protect
public safety and public welfare, and to prevent nuisances." 2 P. NIcHoLs, supra note 56, §
6.16[2].
136. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
137. Id. at 591.
138. Id. at 595.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 596.
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police power and a regulation which constitutes a taking is one of degree.' 14
The test effectively focuses on only one factor: the degree to which the
regulation interferes with property rights. 142 The test measures the degree of
interference by the diminution in property values. 143 Thus, a regulation which
destroys a substantial portion of an individual's property rights is considered
a taking under the Pennsylvania Coal test.'"
There are two major difficulties in applying the "too far" test. First there
is no standard to determine exactly what "too far" means. 4 5 While many
141. See supra note 123.
142. The Court stated that "[tihe protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment
presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such
use without compensation." 260 U.S. at 415. A strong public interest was found insufficient
"to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the consitutional way of paying for the
change." Id. at 416. The Court found the determinative factor to be the degree of interference.
See supra note 123.
143. The diminution in value standard is most often used by courts to determine compens-
ability. L. Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165, 175-76
(1974). See City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 394 (rex. 1978) (loss of rentals is
appropriate measure of damages). For a discussion of other methods which the courts use to
calculate an unacceptable degree of interference, see generally Stoebuck, supra note 57, at 1062-
65 (in determining at what point a regulation constitutes a taking, courts have employed a
variety of terms, such as "prevention of all feasible uses," and "unreasonable," and have
looked to the extent of diminution in monetary value).
144. See supra note 116-130 & accompanying text.
145. Determining at what point loss, due to zoning regulations, is so great as to constitute
a taking is an issue which has caused courts much consternation. Professor Anderson states:
No basis for precise prediction can be found in the dollars-and-cents evidence
reported by the courts in the constitutional cases. Examination of approximately
50 cases in which the courts mentioned proof of the value of the subject land if
used for a permitted purpose, as compared with its value if used for a proposed
purpose outlawed by the ordinance, revealed that about half of the ordinances were
approved and half were found unconstitutional. Moreover, the loss of use value in
the cases where the ordinances were upheld was about the same as the loss proved
in the cases where an opposite result was reached.
R. ANDERSON, AmmutcAN LAW OF ZoNflm § 2.23 at 101 (1968).
Professor Berger discusses the problem of determining the point at which the loss of value
becomes substantial enough to constitute a taking:
Do we look at what [a property owner] paid for the parcel or at its current market
value? If current market value, do we consider the impact of the control itself upon
that value? Since [the property owner] had actually sold off more than two-thirds
of his frontage before the lawsuit began, how should the sales transaction alter the
investment base? If [the property owner] has already recouped his original outlay,
does he have any investment base in the remainder? Easy answers do not leap to
mind.
C. Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor
Costonis, 76 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 799, 819 (1976).
The Court in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), stated:
There is no set formula to determine where a regulation ends and [a] taking begins.
Although a comparison of values before and after is relevant, see Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon [260 U.S. 393 (1922)], it is by no means conclusive, see
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, [239 U.S. 394 (1915)], where a diminution in value from
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courts announce the proposition that "if a regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking,"'' 46 few courts have found that a taking actually
existed under the particular set of facts before them.' 47 Furthermore, the
"too far" test has been applied in a logically inconsistent manner."8s The
test is based on the premise that a regulation which substantially interferes
with an individual's property rights will constitute a taking by the govern-
mental entity."49 The fifth and fourteenth amendments require a government
entity to provide just compensation for property it -takes. 110 However, many
courts applying the "too far" test have found a taking but have failed to
require that compensation be paid to the property owner."'5
3. Enterprise/arbitral distinction
The enterprise/arbitral theory, identified by Professor Joseph Sax, 112 fo-
cuses on the function of government action to determine a line of demar-
cation between a land use regulation which places an acceptable burden on
a landowner and one which constitutes a taking."' According to this doctrine,
governments perform essentially two functions, enterprise and arbitral.' 5 A
$800,000 to $60,000 was upheld.
Id. at 594.
146. 260 U.S. at 415. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (Congress has
authority to assure public access to marina but action may go so far as to amount to a taking);
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590-94 (1962) (governmental action in form of a
regulation may be so onerous as to result in a taking).
147. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-85 11980) (right to exclude
not so essential to economic value of property that its loss constituted a taking). In Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979), the Court found that although a regulation prevented the most
profitable use of the plaintiff's property, it did not constitute a taking. The Court stated that
regulations are burdens to be borne to secure advantages of living in civilized society. Id. at
66-68. See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (no taking
occurred because ordinance advanced general welfare and did not prohibit reasonable beneficial
use of property); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (because ordinance
not shown to be unreasonable, no taking occurred).
148. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Court found that a taking
had occurred, but did not compensate; invalidation of statute was remedy); Davis v. Pima
County, 121 Ariz. App. 343, 590 P.2d 459 (1978) (while appellants may have established
"taking" they are not entitled to monetary damages; judicial remedy is undoing of wrongful
legislation), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979); McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253
(Minn. 1980) (zoning ordinance which resulted in substantial decline in value of property
constituted a "taking," proper remedy was to enjoin enforcement of ordinance and allow city
to decide whether to withdraw ordinance or proceed in eminent domain).
149. See supra note 125-26.
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment is made applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 239 (1897).
151. See supra note 148.
152. J. Sax, Takings and The Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964).
153. Id. at 61-64.
154. Id. at 62-63.
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government entity that interferes with property pursuant to its enterprise
function seeks to acquire resources for its own needs.' In this situation the
government acts to enhance its own "resource position,"' for example,
taking land to build a road. The government acts in its arbitral capacity
when it functions as a mediator of disputes among citizens.1'7 A land use
regulation which prohibits a noxious use of property falls into this latter
category because the government is acting on behalf of one citizen who has
been adversely affected by another citizen's activity." 8
The enterprise/arbitral doctrine dictates that the government must com-
pensate a landowner who has incurred economic loss when that loss is
occasioned by the government acting in its enterprise capacity.5 9 Conversely,
when the government acts in its arbitral capacity, no compensation is due
to the landowner. 6 The rationale underlying the distinction is that potential
monetary liability would act as a disincentive for arbitrary exercises of
government power.' 6' The theory maintains that a governmental entity will
generally act tyrannically when acting in its own interest and, therefore, a
deterrent is necessary. 62 However, because the government will be less
155. Id. at 63.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 62.
158. See Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 128-29, 316 N.E.2d
305, 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 14 (1974) (where government enjoins one individual property owner's
noxious use of his property for benefit of public, government is acting in its arbitral capacity).
159. Sa.x, supra note 152, at 63.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 64.
162. Sax cites three dangers that are posed when the government acts in its enterprise capacity.
I) The Risk of Discrimination: When the government acts to acquire resources for its own
account, like any buyer, it has the power to control the bargain. Yet unlike the typical buyer,
the government is unrestrained by the usual market forces which nave the effect of tempering
the demands a typical buyer makes upon a given seller. By dictating the terms upon which it
will act, "the official procurement process often provides a particularly apt opportunity for
rewarding the faithful or punishing the opposition." Sax, supra note 153, at 64. The requirement
of compensation would give some protection to the particular person or entity who might be
singled out for imposition of 4 burden.
2) The Risk of Excessive Zeal: The government typically "acts as a judge in its own case."
Id. at 65. This power and immunity from scrutiny may create a situation where the government
acts overzealously in acquiring resources for its own account. This power could cause injustice
to the individual or entity from whom the property is acquired and can be somewhat mitigated
by the compensation requirement. Id.
3) The Scope of Exposure to Risk: "Property owners in competition with one another are
each subject to similar duties and to the demands of each other individually or in concert; the
physical community more or less defines the scope of the risk, and each member of the
community is similarly situated" with respect to the duties he owes and the risks to which he
is exposed. Id. at 66. The fact that each of the similarly situated landowners is subject to the
same duties and liabilities tends to insure a degree of fair play. When a government entity
enters a community and intends to build a dam or road, it has no physical existence in the
community and it is not held to the same duties as other property owners and is not subjected
to the same risk. The government entity need not be concerned with its continued existence in
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inclined to act tyrannically when its own interests are not at stake, monetary
compensation is not required when the government acts in its arbitral ca-
pacity. 163
Although the Supreme Court has not made extensive use of the enterprise/
arbitral theory,'6 there are a few cases in which the Court has applied this
distinction in its analysis. In United States v. Causby,1"' the owner of a
chicken farm, over which the United States Army and Navy conducted
aircraft training exercises, brought suit to enjoin the exercises.'"6 The flights
agitated the chickens and caused the chickens to inflict injury on them-
selves. 6 7 As a result, the owner incurred serious economic loss.'"
The Court focused its analysis on the nature of the government's action
and characterized it in two ways.'6 9 First, the Court indicated that the
government action carried a physical invasion element.' 70 A fundamental
concept of property law provides that a landowner may exercise rights with
the community and, therefore, has no incentive to restrain its action. The government is exposed
to limited risk, while the property owner is exposed to increased risk, the limitations of which
have not been defined by the community. Therefore, when the government acts to acquire, it
must at least be held to a compensation risk. Id. at 64-66. Compensation is intended to mitigate
the effect of these dangers.
163. Id. at 64.
164. The Supreme Court's regulatory taking analysis has developed around its substantive
due process analysis. Compare Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-96 (1962)
(applied Lawton test and found that ordinance which is valid exercise of police power is not
unconstitutional even if it deprives property of its most beneficial use) and Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (applied substantive due process analysis and
found that to declare ordinance unconstitutional it must be found arbitrary or unreasonable
and unrelated to public welfare) and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-74 (1887) (applied
three part substantive due process test) with Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978) (applied modified substantive due process analysis to determine whether a taking
had occurred) and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 107 Sup. Ct. 1232 (1987)
(applied modified substantive due process analysis to taking question). However, the Court has
occasionally incorporated the enterprise/arbitral concept into a case. See United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). This concept has appeared in a number of state court decisions.
Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976) (made distinction between government acting in enterprise capacity and
government acting in arbitral capacity and held no compensation due when government acts
pursuant to arbitral capacity). See also In re Charles v. Diamond, 41 N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d
1295, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1977); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wash.
2d. 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977); Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121,
316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
165. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
166. Id. at 258.
167. Id. at 259.
168. The over flights destroyed the property's commercial value as a farm. Id. at 259.
169. See infra notes 170 & 174.
170. The Supreme Court noted that:
[A]irspace is a public highway. Yet it is obvious that if the landowner is to have
full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches
of the enveloping atmosphere.... The landowner owns at least as much of the
space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land.
Id. at 264.
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respect to the space above and below his property. 7' Given this construct,
the Court recognized that by effectively acquiring an easement without
compensating the owner," 2 the military's flights physically invaded a portion
of the plaintiff's property interest.'" The opinion also addressed the fact
that the government utilized the airspace for its own benefit. "74 The Court
found that the government was acting in its enterprise capacity. In essence,
the Court found that the government acted in accordance with its eminent
domain power, taking property rights to enhance its own resource position.
The Court held that this constituted a governmental taking.'"
The enterprise/arbitral distinction is similar to the substantive due process
concept because, under both theories, the difference in the government's
eminent domain power and the government's police power is one in "kind"
and not one of "degree.""16 Based on the enterprise/arbitral distinction, the
government will never be required to compensate an individual landowner
when it acts to enhance the health, safety or welfare of the populace."' In
this situation the government acts pursuant to its arbitral capacity or police
power. However, when it acts to enhance its own "resource position" and
interferes with individual property rights for its own benefit, it must com-
pensate the owner."18 This simply restates the Mugler doctrine: a valid exercise
171. Blackstone's definition of property rights includes the right to that air space which is a
reasonable distance above the property in possession. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 17.
(R.I. Burn rev. ed. 1978) (9th ed. 1783). Blackstone quotes Sir Edward Coke in his definition
of property:
'Land' says Sir Edward Coke, comprehendeth, in its legal signification, any ground,
soil, or earth whatsoever, as arable, meadows, pastures, woods, moors, waters,
marshes, surzes and heath. It legally includeth also all cattles, houses, and other
buildings: for they consist saith he, of two things; land, which is the foundation,
and structure thereupon .... Land hath also, in it's legal signification, an indefinite
extent, upwards as well as downwards. Cutus est solem, ejus €st usque ad coelum,
is the maxim of the law, upwards; therefore no man may erect any building, or
the like to overhang another's land. ..'
Id. at 18. See also Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 491-92, 79 N.E. 716, 718 (1906)
(The court stated "(A]n owner is entitled to the absolute and undisturbed possession of every
part of his premises, including the space above, as much as a mine beneath.").
172. 328 U.S. at 267.
173. The Supreme Court stated "[i]n this case, ... the damages were not merely conse-
quential. They were the product of a direct invasion of [the owner's] domain." Id. at 265-66.
174. Id. at 262, n.7.
175. Although the Supreme Court did not expressly use the enterprise/arbitral distinction,
in its analysis the Court discussed the government's exercise of dominion over the airspace for
its own use. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). Compare this Court's treatment of the government's
affirmative use of the airspace here with its treatment of a restriction on the use of airspace in
Penn Central.
176. 3 P. NicHOLs, supra note 56, § 8.1[4].
177. Professor Stoebuck explains that under the enterprise/arbitral distinction "the compen-
sation question turns not upon the intensity of government regulation, but upon which of two
possible purposes that regulation serves." Stoebuck, supra note 57, at 1076.
178. Sax, supra note 152, at 63.
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of police power will never require an award of monetary compensation. 79
As long as a land use regulation is justified as being in the interest of the
public and, therefore, characterized as the government arbitrating between
competing groups of citizens, compensation need not be awarded and the
individual landowner must bear the burden of the public benefit.
D. The Compensation Issue
The Court's inability to provide a decisive and consistent answer to the
question of when and if a valid land use regulation constitutes a taking has
created inconsistencies in the Court's treatment of related issues. The Su-
preme Court has addressed the compensation issue as a question distinct
from the taking issue.18 0 Upon finding a regulatory taking, courts have
typically allowed the government either to repeal the regulation or to exercise
its power of eminent domain to purchase the" property interest. '8 While these
remedies address the landowner's post trial loss in a satisfactory manner,
Courts have failed to provide a remedy for the landowner's interim loss. If
the regulation is found to constitute a taking, the regulation has worked its
interference from the time of enactment. Theoretically, it would follow that
the landowner must be compensated for the period of time that the regulation
worked a taking; that is, from the date of enactment until the regulation
was repealed or the property interest was purchased. The Court struggled,
unsuccessfully, with this issue in the four cases discussed below.
179. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
180. Given the dictates of the fifth amendment's just compensation clause, it would seem
that once a regulation is deemed a taking, compensation would be mandated. This, however,
is not what the Court has done. The Court in Pennsylvania Coal found a taking and enjoined
the enforcement of the regulation, but did not award compensation. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). More
recently, in Kaiser Aetna, the Court again found a taking, enjoined enforcement of the
government action, but provided no compensation for the period of time that the government
action worked a taking on the property. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 414 U.S. 164 (1979).
Similarly, many state courts which recognize regulatory takings are reluctant to award com-
pensation for the period of time between the enactment of the regulation and its judicial
invalidation. Id. See, e.g., Davis v. Pima County, 121 Ariz. App. 343, 590 P.2d 459 (1978)
(while appellants may have established "taking" they are not entitled to monetary damages;
judicial remedy is undoing of wrongful legislation), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979); Mailman
Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (where zoning
ordinance determined to be unreasonable, remedy is to declare ordinance invalid), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 844 (1974); McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980) (zoning
ordinance which resulted in substantial decline in value of property constituted a "taking,"
proper remedy is to enjoin enforcement of ordinance while city decides whether to withdraw
ordinance or proceed in eminent domain); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. New York City, 39
N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (compen-
sation mandated when state appropriates property for public use; where deprivation is in form
of a regulation no compensation need be paid, regardless of degree of deprivation).
For an in-depth discussion on the issue of remedies in the area of regulatory takings see
Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HAsrmos CONsr. L.Q. 491 (1981).
181. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
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The first case, Agins v. City of Tiburon, ' involved the challenge of a
California zoning ordinance which limited the development of a five acre
tract to a maximum of five single family residences. The plaintiff sued on
an inverse condemnation theory claiming that the zoning ordinance consti-
tuted a fifth amendment taking.' The California Supreme Court held that
no taking had occurred because the zoning ordinance did not deprive the
plaintiff of the entire use of his land.' 84 The California court addressed the
plaintiff's use of the inverse condemnation theory and held that although
the property owner could challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance
and request redress in the form of declaratory relief or mandamus, he could
not make use of the inverse condemnation theory.' Essentially, the court
held that evaluation under the due process doctrine was appropriate but
evaluation under the taking doctrine was not.
The plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that
California could not constitutionally preclude an inverse condemnation action
and thereby limit the available remedy to declaratory relief.'8 6 The Supreme
Court affirmed the California court's finding that no taking had occurred
and announced that it was unnecessary to consider the issue of proper
remedies given the status of the case.'8 7
In 1981, San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego 8 came
before the Supreme Court. The plaintiff owned a 412 acre parcel which,
when purchased, was zoned for industrial and agricultural use. 8 9 The city
subsequently rezoned nearly 214 of the 412 acres pursuant to an open space
plan.190 The plaintiff claimed that the "only beneficial use of the property
was an industrial park, a usethat would be inconsistent with the open space
designation" and, therefore, the rezoning constituted a taking.' 9' The plaintiff
sued under an inverse condemnation theory claiming the open space plan
worked a taking and alternatively sought mandamus and declaratory relief.' 92
The California courts held that the plaintiff could not recover compensation
because the complaint addressed an overzealous exercise of the police power
by the city. Such a violation was actionable under the substantive due process
clause for which mandamus or declaratory relief were the available reme-
dies. " The appellate court held that the plaintiff would have to retry the
182. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
183. Id. at 258.
184. Id. at 259.
185. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 269-70, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 373, 598 P.2d 25, 26 (1979).
186. 447 U.S. at 259.
187. Id.
188. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
189. Id. at 624.
190. Id. There was some dispute as to how much land was rezoned. Id. at 624 nn.2-4.
191. Id. at 626.
192. Id. San Diego Gas & Electric Company requested $6,150,000 in compensation. Id.
193. The Superior Court for the County of San Diego found a taking and allowed damages
of over $3,000,000. 450 U.S. at 627. The Appellate Court affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court
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case to obtain relief through the appropriate remedies because certain factual
issues had not been resolved at the trial level.19
In its review of San Diego Gas, the United States Supreme Court again
failed to reach the merits of the compensation issue. Since the California
court's adjudication of the case was found not to constitute a final judgment,
the Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.' 95 However,
Justice Brennan contended that the finality requirement was met and analyzed
the compensation question in his dissent.'1 The essence of Justice Brennan's
dissent is embodied in the Court's Glendale analysis. 97
of California vacated the opinion and retransferred the case to the court of appeals in light of
the intervening decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Id. at 628. The
California Court of Appeals reversed, citing Agins as precedent for the proposition that an
inverse condemnation cause of action is inappropriate where the government action at issue is
in the nature of a regulation. Id. at 629-30. The California Supreme Court denied review. Id.
194. Id. at 630.
195. The Supreme Court found that the decision failed to constitute a final judgment for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1257. 450 U.S. at 633. Section 1257 dictates that the Court may review
only "final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision
could be had." Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). The Court held that the judgment was not final
because the Court of Appeals had held that before a remedy could be considered, the case
would have to be retried to determine unresolved factual issues as to whether any remedy was
available. 450 U.S. at 433.
196. Justice Brennan's dissent foreshadowed the Court's holding in Glendale. Justice Brennan
believed that the Court mischaracterized the California court's holding and viewed the decision
as ripe for review. 450 U.S. at 637 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan interpreted the
state court opinion as holding that a government's exercise of its police power can never
constitute a compensable taking, id. at 639, but must be reviewed under the due process clause.
Id. at 641 n.4. Justice Brennan stated:
It is not merely linguistic coincidence that the California Supreme Court in Agins
never analyzed the Tiburon zoning ordinance to determine whether a Fifth Amend-
ment 'taking' without just compensation had occurred. Instead, the court noted
that 'a zoning ordinance may be unconstitutional and subject to invalidation only
when its effect is to deprive the landowner of substantially all reasonable use of
his property.
Id. at 641 n.4 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan interpreted the California court's
position as flatly contradicting the precedent of the Supreme Court and cited Pennsylvania
Coal for the proposition that a land use regulation may constitute a compensable taking. Id.
at 649.
After establishing that a land use regulation could constitute a taking, Justice Brennan
addressed the issue of compensation. He reasoned that because the fifth amendment mandates
compensation when a taking occurs, the government entity which promulgates a regulation that
works a taking must pay compensation from the point in time the regulation was enacted until
the regulation is rescinded or amended. Id. at 653. Under this analysis, the regulation is deemed
to have worked a temporary taking for the period of time it was in effect.
197. See infra text accompanying notes 275-93. Although Justice Rehnquist concurred in the
majority's dismissal of San Diego Gas, he stated that "li]f I were satisfied that this appeal was
from a final judgment or decree of the California Court of Appeals, . . . I would have little
difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan."
450 U.S. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist adopted Justice Brennan's
analysis almost in its entirety in his Glendale majority opinion.
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The opportunity for resolving the compensation issue presented itself to
the Court two more times.' 8 The Supreme Court dismissed both cases without
addressing the issue. In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,'" the Court held that the case was not
ripe for review for two reasons. First, the Court found that the plaintiff had
not sought a variance to the zoning ordinance. Therefore, he had not
exhausted all administrative remedies."O Additionally, the Court found that
the plaintiff had not shown that state law failed to provide an adequate
remedy for an excessive regulation.?' Similarly, the Court held that the
fourth case, MacDonald Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, did not meet
the procedural criteria for review and thus the court never reached the issue
of compensation. 202
III. THE SuPREME CouRT's RECENT PA1r'mRs
A. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
The Court attempted to reconcile the two major doctrines of Mugler v.
Kansas and Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in the case of Penn Central
Transportation Company v. New York City.20 In the Penn Central opinion,
the Court repudiated the Mugler holding that an exercise of the police power
can never constitute a taking. By declaring that an oppressive regulation
198. MacDonald Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
199. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
200. Id. at 186. The Court stated that a claim brought under the fifth amendment's just
compensation clause is not ripe until the "entity charged with implementing the regulations has
reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue."
Id. The plaintiff may have been able to obtain a variance which would have allowed for
development according to its plan. Id. at 188.
201. 473 U.S. at 194 n.13. The Court stated that because the fifth amendment prohibits a
taking without an award of just compensation, no violation of the constitution occurs until
just compensation is denied by the state. Here, the plaintiff had not shown that the state
provided inadequate procedures or remedies for his alleged deprivation. Id. at 197. The Court
went on to cite state cases where state statutes had been interpreted as providing for an inverse
condemnation action when a regulation works a taking. Id. at 196.
202. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (because plaintiff failed to submit all subdivision proposals to
planning commission, there was no final position on how regulations would be applied to
plaintiff's land).
203. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Court reviewed the history of the regulatory taking issue and
concluded that "this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for
determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action
be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a
few persons." Id. at 124. The Court, however, identified two factors which consistently appear
in the cases: 1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant re: the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with the claimant's property rights; and, 2) the character of the
government action. The Court then proceeded to develop and apply its newly created test. Id.
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may constitute a taking, the Court seemingly adopted the Pennsylvania Coal
standard.204 However, the Court's analysis incorporated the Mugler factor
which allows justification for an oppressive regulation, provided the regu-
lation is enacted to serve a public purpose.2°0 Incorporation of the concepts
of both Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal into a single set of criteria resulted
in intensified confusion. 20 The Court's first major attempt at reconciliation
resulted in an opinion which one commentator described as wavering "be-
tween the taking, equal protection and due process doctrines." 07
Penn Central involved a challenge to the New York City Landmark
Preservation Act by the owners of the Penn Central terminal.1m Penn Central
terminal had been designated an historic landmark subject to certain restric-
tions on its use which were enumerated in the Landmark Preservation Act.20
Pursuant to the requirements of the Act, the plaintiffs submitted a plan to
the Landmark Commission for building an office tower over the terminal.2t0
The plan was rejected by the Landmark Commission on the grounds that
the office tower would "overwhelm" the terminal and destroy a major
portion of its aesthetic value. 21' The terminal owners filed suit in the New
York Supreme Court on the ground that the Landmark Preservation Act,
as applied to their property, constituted a taking without just compensation
and deprived them of their property without due process of law.212
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, declared that the Court had
been "unable to develop any 'set formula' ",213 to determine when a land
use regulation amounts to a taking and then proceeded to develop an analysis
which borrowed concepts from both Pennsylvania Coal and Mugler. Justice
204. The Court indicated that a taking would be found more readily when the government
interfered with private property in a physical way. Nonetheless, the Court conceded that a
taking may be found in the regulatory context. Id. at 124.
205. The Court noted that when a regulation promoted public health, safety or welfare, the
Court had historically upheld such regulation, even though it prohibited the most beneficial
use of the property. Id. at 125.
206. This opinion created confusion because the Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal doctrines are
at odds with each other. Mugler holds that a regulation will never contitute a taking because
the power of eminent domain and the police power are government powers which are different
in kind. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text. Pennsylvania Coal, however, holds
that the eminent domain power and the police power are merely different in the degrees of
their application. "The Supreme Court's lengthy majority and dissenting opinions in Penn
Central compound rather than disentangle the doctrinal imbroglio over when a taking occurs."
Stoebuck, supra note 57, at 1069.
207. Mandelker, supra note 180, at 500.
208. 438 U.S. at 107.
209. Under the prevailing New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, N.Y.C. ADMIN.
CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976), once a structure is designated a landmark an owner has a
duty to keep the exterior features of the building in good repair and the Landmark Preservation
Commission must approve any plan to alter the exterior of the building. 438 U.S. at 11 1-12.
210. 438 U.S. at 116.
211. Id. at 118.
212. Id. at 119.
213. Id. at 124.
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Brennan observed that previous decisions reflected "ad-hoc, factual
inquiries ' 2 '4 and identified two significant factors in those inquiries.21' The
first factor, the economic impact of the regulation, required an evaluation
of the degree to which a particular regulation interfered with a property
interest.2 '6 The second factor, the character of the government action, focused
on whether the government action could be characterized as a physical
invasion, and whether it was enacted to promote the public welfare.2 7
The economic impact factor incorporates notions of both Mugler and
Pennsylvania Coal, and reflects the "oppressiveness of the means" factor
of Mugler.21 1 The degree of the regulation's economic oppressiveness plays
a negligible role under a Mugler analysis. If a regulation is a valid exercise
of the police power, in that it serves a public purpose, the oppressiveness of
the regulation will not tilt the scale in favor of finding a taking.219
In Pennsylvania Coal, however, the degree of interference was the focus
of the analysis while the nature of the government action played a subordinate
role. 20 Under the Pennsylvania Coal analysis, a legitimate public purpose
will not justify a regulation which deprives a landowner of a significant
value in his property. 2 ' The Penn Central Court attempted to find a middle
ground for the interference factor, giving it more weight than a Mugler
analysis would, but at the same time not allowing it to dominate the inquiry,
as was the case in Pennsylvania Coal.
The second factor, the character of government action, clearly echoes the
public purpose element of Mugler. Under the Mugler analysis, a regulation
enacted to promote the public welfare never constitutes a taking.m The
nature of the government action was, therefore, outcome determinative.
Under the Court's analysis in Penn Central, the Landmark Act restrictions
were found to play a substantial role in promoting the public interest in the
city's aesthetic value.223 This finding played a central role in the Court's





218. The difference is in the emphasis placed on this factor in the analysis. In Mugler, if
the regulation could be justified by a public purpose, no degree of interference or oppressiveness
would cause the regulation to fail. Indeed, in Mugler, the plaintiff was deprived of his entire
business. See also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (plaintiff suffered total loss of
business but was not compensated). In Penn Central, this "oppressiveness of the means" factor
appears to be given more weight in the analysis.
219. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 123.
222. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
223. 438 U.S. at 129.
224. The Court concluded that "the application of New York City's Landmarks Law has
not effected a 'taking' . . . . The restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion
of the general welfare and ... permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site ... "
Id. at 138.
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viewed the nature of the government action as one factor in its analysis and
also evaluated the economic deprivation the regulation caused or was likely
to cause. The Court then balanced both factors in reaching its final deter-
mination.2u
At first glance, the Court's language in Penn Central suggests an attempt
to strike a balance between Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal.- However, a
closer look at the opinion reveals that the Court's restructured analysis
continued to favor the social interest in property. The Penn Central Court
appeared to require a major degree of economic deprivation before it would
find that the property owner's "investment backed expectations" were sub-
ject to unacceptable interference. 2 7 Furthermore, the Court focused on the
lost property rights as a percentage of the entire parcel of property rather
than considering each lost property right as a unit unto itself.-' The Court's
treatment and application of these factors resulted in an analysis which
continued to defer to the social interest in property when a land use regulation
was at issue.
In evaluating the degree of interference with the property owner's "in-
vestment backed expectations," the Court found that the Landmark Act did
not interfere with the present uses of the property and that the owner was
able to obtain a reasonable return on its investment.2 9 The Court, therefore,
concluded that the degree of interference with the owner's property rights
did not rise to the level of a taking. However, in the final footnote of the
opinion, the Court indicated that if the circumstances changed and the
terminal ceased to be economically viable, some relief would be available.? 0
The ability of the property owner to prove that a regulatory taking has
occurred is restricted by the Penn Central Court's analysis of the degree of
interference involved. First, the Court indicated that as long as the lan-
downer's economic situation remained the same, no taking could be found. 231
Since the terminal owner realized a reasonable rate of return, the regulation
had no impact on the property's present uses.2 2 Second, the Court's final
footnote implies that the Court will require a great degree of deprivation
before a regulation will be deemed to have worked a taking.233 The Court's
suggestion that the point where a taking may be found is where property
225. In fact, in the majority's final footnote the Court emphasized that the holding was
based on the particular facts and circumstances involved. The Court further indicated that if
circumstances changed, and the property ceased to be economically viable, the plaintiff could
potentially obtain relief at that time. Id. at 138 n.36.
226. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
228. See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
229. 438 U.S. at 136.
230. Id. at 138 n.36.
231. Id. at 136.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 138 (court indicated that if "circumstances have so changed that the terminal
ceases to be 'economically viable' the plaintiff may have cause of action).
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ceases to be "economically viable" implies that a property owner will be
required to show a total loss of economic value to establish a taking.
The Penn Central Court's focus on the lost rights as they relate to the
entire parcel of property serves to further restrict the ability of the property
owner to recover. The Court stated that the degree of interference is deter-
mined by focusing on the property as a whole rather than on the airspace
above the terminal as a separate segment. 234 The Court concluded that in
relation to the entire property, the loss of airspace rights did not constitute
an unacceptable degree of deprivation. 2" The result of this "property as a
whole" evaluation is to weaken the impact of the deprivation element in
relation to the government action element. Thus, a landowner must now be
deprived of a major portion of his property before the Court will consider
the deprivation severe enough to counter-balance a finding that the regulation
was enacted pursuant to a legitimate public purpose.
B. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis
The Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis36
addressed the taking question once again. Keystone involved a challenge to
the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act by an association of coal companies. 237 The
Pennsylvania Act prohibited the mining of more than 50 percent of the coal
in areas where subsidence due to mining operations could cause damage to
pre-existing public buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries. 238 The plaintiffs filed
suit in federal district court to enjoin the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources from enforcing the Subsidence Act. 2 9 The coal
association alleged that their inability to mine the coal in the areas specified
by the Subsidence Act constituted an uncompensated taking prohibited by
the fifth amendment just compensation clause. 240
234. Id. at 131-32.
235. Id. at 136-37.
236. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
237. Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 52
1406.1 § 4 (Purdon Supp. 1986). Section 4 provides:
In order to guard thehealth, safety and general welfare of the public, no owner,
operator, lessor, lessee, or general manager, superintendent or other person in
charge of or having supervision over any bituminous coal mine shall mine bituminous
coal so as to cause damage as a result of the caving-in, collapse or subsidence of
the following surface structures in place on April 27, 1966, overlying or in the
proximity of the mine:
(1) Any public building or any noncommercial structure customarily used by the
public ....
(2j Any dwelling used for human habitation; and
(3) Any cemetery or public burial ground ....
Tit. 52 § 4 (quoted in 107 S. Ct. at 1237 n.6).
238. 107 S. Ct. at 1238.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1239.
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The Keystone plaintiffs argued that the State of Pennsylvania recognized
three estates in land: the "mineral estate," the "surface estate," and the
"support estate."' ' 1 The mining companies generally acquired the support
estate along with the mineral estate when negotiating acquisitions.2 42 The
other party to the transaction obtained only the surface estate and typically
waived the right to any damages which might occur due to mining opera-
tions. 243 The plaintiff argued that by prohibiting all coal mining in certain
areas, the Subsidence Act constituted a taking of their support estate.2
The plaintiffs framed their taking argument around the Pennsylvania Coal
doctrine . 4 The district court, however, did not find a taking and distin-
guished Pennsylvania Coal. The court held that the Subsidence Act was a
proper exercise of the state's police power, and was enacted to promote the
welfare of the state's general populace.2 6 The district court distinguished
Pennsylvania Coal, stating that the majority in Pennsylvania Coal had found
that no public interest was served by the Kohler Act they had reviewed and,
therefore, there was no justification for the state's interference with the
individual property rights in that instance3u 7 The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the Subsidence Act was justified as a legitimate exercise of the
police power.248
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Keystone 49 and applied its Penn
Central analysis.250 The analysis focused on the nature of the government
241. Id. at 1238. This unique approach to property ownership developed in Pennsylvania
between 1890 and 1920. At that time, the coal industry dominated the state economy and was
given a great deal of freedom in its actions. By severing title in this manner, coal companies
were able to mine the coal underground and profit from the sale of surface title which might
otherwise have gone unused. Id. at 1238-39.
242. 107 S. Ct. at 1238.
243. Id. at 1239.
244. Id.
245. The petitioners argued that Pennsylvania Coal controlled the case and structured their
claims according to those involved in Pennsylvania Coal. They argued that the Act's impact
on their support estate was so severe as to work a taking. 107 S. Ct. at 1239. This argument
emphasizes the "degree of interference" factor which was similarly focused on in Pennsylvania
Coal. Additionally, the petitioner in Keystone contended that the Subsidence Act impaired
contractual agreements whereby the surface owners had waived their ability to impose liability
on the coal companies for surface damage. Id. at 1251. A similar argument was made in
Pennsylvania Coal. The petitioners claimed the Kohler Act impaired the obligation of the
contract between the' parties and worked a taking of their property. 260 U.S. at 394-95.
246. 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
247. Id.
248. 771 F.2d 707, 715 (3rd Cir. 1985) (Pennsylvania Subsidence Act is legitimate means of
protecting environmental and economic well being of Commonwealth).
249. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
250. The takings analysis revolved around the two factors the Court used in Penn Central:
the character of the government action and the diminution of value and investment backed
expectations. 107 S. Ct. at 1242. As in Penn Central the Court refused to view the portion of
the petitioner's property which was interfered with as a unit unto itself. The Court chose instead
to view the loss as a percentage of the entire property. Id.
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action and the degree of interference with existing property rights and
investment backed expectationsY' The Keystone Court, in analyzing the
nature of the government action, found a public purpose in the Subsidence
Act and distinguished Pennsylvania Coal on that basis.2 2 The Court found
that the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Subsidence Act to promote
important public interests in conservation, safety and economic well being,23
whereas the regulation in Pennsylvania Coal was enacted to serve private
interests. The majority adopted the lower courts' views that the Kohler Act
in Pennsylvania Coal was distinguishable from the present Subsidence Act .2 4
Noting that the state's police power was being used to "abate activity akin
to a public nuisance," the Court incorporated language from the noxious
use line of cases and found this public purpose to be solid justification for
upholding the Subsidence Act.21
The second step of the analysis focused on the degree of interference
generated by the Subsidence Act. The Court first noted that the claim was
a facial challenge to the statute and not a claim of specific injury. 2 6 Because
the coal companies had not alleged an actual injury, the burden of proving
a taking was more difficult to satisfy.2 7 The Court began its analysis by
noting that the plaintiff had not shown that the Subsidence Act made mining
in general impracticable. 28 The plaintiff had submitted statistics from 13 of
the mines that the companies operated. These statistics showed that the
percentage of coal required by statute to be left in place ranged from less
than 1 percent to 9.4 percent.2 9 The majority refused to view this coal as a
separate unit of property for purposes of quantifying Ioss.2 60 The Court
quoted Penn Central:
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action
has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of
251. 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing Pa. Ann. Stat., Tit. 52, § 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986)).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1243.
256. Id. at 1246.
257. The petitioners appealed the Court of Appeals' decision on the ground that the enactment
of the statute constituted a taking per se. They did not base their claim on the actual damage
that the statute would cause their particular property. Id. at 1246. The petitioners explained
that assessing the impact of the statute on their property would require expensive and complex
proof that they were not prepared to present. Id. The Court stated that, particularly on cases
raising the taking issue, facial attacks on statutes were disfavored. The Court required petitioners
to show that the regulation denied them economically viable use of their land. 107 S. Ct. at
1247.
258. Id. at 1246-47.
259. Id. at 1248 n.24.
260. Id.
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the action and on the nature of the interference with rights in the parcel
as a whole .... 21,
The Court found that this loss of coal neither made it commercially im-
practicable to mine, nor interfered with the reasonable investment backed
expectations of the coal companies and, therefore, did not constitute a
taking.262
The Keystone Court briefly addressed the plaintiff's argument that the
Subsidence Act destroyed the value of the plaintiff's support estate.A6 The
Court refused to view the support estate as a separate property interest. 2"
The support estate was characterized as merely a percentage of the plaintiff's
property interest and, as such, the loss of this segment was deemed insig-
nificant.2 65
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent argued that the majority opinion gave
undue weight to the nature of the government action through a faulty reading
of Pennsylvania Coal.26 The dissent stated that the Kohler Act in Pennsyl-
vania Coal had a public interest objective, since it was promulgated "as
remedial legislation, designed to cure existing evils and abuses." 267 Nonethe-
less, under the Pennsylvania Coal analysis, the public nature of the Kohler
Act was "insufficient to release the government from the compensation
requirement." 2 68 Therefore, in Pennsylvania Coal, the existence of a public
purpose did not excuse the government from its actions and a taking was
found. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that "[tihe protection of private
property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public
use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compen-
sation."269
In his dissent, the Chief Justice argued that the Keystone Court erred in
focusing on the lost property as a percentage of the whole.2 70 Rather than
261. Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)
(emphasis in original)).
262. Id. at 1249.
263. Id. at 1250.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Justice Rehnquist stated:
The Court first determines that this case is different from Pennsyliania Coal because
'[t]he Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a
significant threat to the common welfare.' In my view, reliance on this factor
represents both a misreading of Pennsylvania Coal and a misunderstanding of our
precedents.
107 S. Ct. at 1254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 107 S. Ct. at 1242).
267. Id. at 1255 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Kohler Act of 1921, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 52 § 661 (Purdon 1954)).
268. Id. at 1255.
269. Id.(quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added)).
270. "This conclusion cannot be based on the view that the interests are too insignificant to
warrant protection by the Fifth Amendment, for it is beyond cavil that government appropriation
of 'relatively small amounts of private property for its own use' requires just compensation."
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1258 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 107 S. Ct. at 1250 n.27).
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viewing the loss as two percent of the entire coal available to the companies,
the dissent argued that the two percent should be viewed as a 27 ton loss.271
To focus on the loss as a percentage of the whole had the effect of watering
down the degree of loss element. The Chief Justice contended that the
Court's view turned on the fact that the taking at issue was regulatory and
that its view was inconsistent with the traditional principles of eminent
domain. 2 " According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, in cases where the govern-
ment physically invades a portion of private property, compensation is
required for that portion.273 However, under the majority's analysis, the
Court will not find a regulatory interference to be a taking unless the property
owner has suffered a major degree of loss in relation to the entire property
interest.274
C. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles
Several months after the Keystone decision, the Court addressed the
compensation issue in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles. 271 The plaintiff in Glendale was a religious
organization which owned 21 acres in a canyon in the Los Angeles National
Forest. This parcel was situated along the Middle Fork Creek, a natural
drainage channel for a watershed owned by the National Forest Service.276
In 1978, a flood destroyed the camp that the church maintained for handi-
capped children.2 7 A storm dropped 11 inches of rain into the watershed
area above the canyon and caused the creek to flood. 27 A forest fire on the
hills upstream from the camp some months before had also increased the
potential for flooding in the camp area. 2 9 After the flood, the county of
Los Angeles enacted an ordinance which prohibited the construction of any
buildings on the plaintiff's land.2"
271. Id. at 1259 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
272. "[Tihe Court's refusal to recognize the coal in the ground as a separate segment of
property for takings purposes is based on the fact that the alleged taking is 'regulatory," rather
than a physical intrusion." Id. at 1258 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 1258 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
274. The Court indicated that to satisfy the regulatory taking criteria, the coal companies'
operations would have to become unprofitable. "The test to be applied in considering this
facial challenge is fairly straightforward. A statute regulating the uses that can be made of
property effects a taking if it 'denies an owner economically viable use of his land . . . ."' 107
S. Ct. at 1247. (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
275. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).




280. The County adopted Interim Ordinance No. 11,855 in January, 1979. "A person shall
not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure, any portion of which is,
or will be, located within the outer boundary lines of the interim flood protection area located
in Mill Creek Canyon . . . ." 107 S. Ct. at 2381-82.
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The church brought an inverse condemnation action in the California
Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance denied the church al use of its
property and that this deprivation constituted a regulatory taking for which
just compensation was due.23' The trial court granted the defendant's motion
to strike that portion of plaintiff's complaint which asserted that a regulatory
taking had occurred.28 2 The court relied on Agins for the proposition that,
in California, a landowner may not maintain an inverse condemnation suit
based upon regulatory action.3 After an unsuccessful appeal, the California
Supreme Court relied on its holding in Agins and denied review.'"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider at what
point compensation is due when a regulation works a taking of private
property. The Court had never determined whether the government must
compensate a landowner for the period of time between the regulation's
enactment and the judicial pronouncement that a taking has occurred.1 5 The
Court assumed a taking had occurred and declined to evaluate whether the
ordinance worked a taking of the plaintiff's property because that issue was
not presented to the Court. 286
The Court's opinion relied on Pennsylvania Coal.23 " The Court stated the
general rule that "government action that works a taking of property rights
necessarily implicates the 'constitutional obligation to pay just compensa-
tion.' ",288 The Court then held that a regulation which is found to constitute
a taking of private property works a taking from the day the regulation is
enacted. 289 The Court reasoned that once a court declares a regulation to be
a taking, the regulating body may amend or discontinue its regulation, or
exercise its power of eminent domain. However, the Court found that the
regulation had worked a taking for the period of time the regulation was in
effect.290 Further, the majority found that temporary takings were not dif-
ferent in kind from permanent takings, and that the constitution mandates
compensation for both. The Court found that merely to invalidate an
ordinance which works a taking of private property is a constitutionally
insufficient remedy. 29' The opinion closed with Justice Holmes' famous quote
281. Id. at 2382.
282. Id.
283. Id. (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d at 275-77).
284. 107 S. Ct. at 2383.
285. Id.
286. In referring to the California court's reliance on Agins in holding that the remedy for
a regulatory interference was limited to non-monetary relief, the Court stated that "[tlhe
disposition of the case on these grounds isolates the remedial question for our consideration."
Id. at 2384.
287. The Glendale Court recognized the Pennsylvania Coal doctrine that "[tihe general rule
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if -egulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 2386.
288. 107 S. Ct. at 2386 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
289. Id. at 2389.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 2388.
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from Pennsylvania Coal that "a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the change. '2 92
The Court finally addressed an issue which had long loomed unanswered
in the background of condemnation and property law. Although the holding
is more protective of private property rights than any land use case since
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court made only a tentative step in that direction.
The Court's holding is limited both by the express language of the opinion
and by the takings analysis which the Court applies to regulation cases.
The Court expressly limited its holding to cases in which the regulation
deprives a landowner of "all use" of his property.23 This limitation rejects
the notion that destruction of something less than total value might constitute
a compensable taking. Conceivably, a regulation could diminish the value
of a landowner's parcel of property by 80 percent and the regulating entity
would not be required to compensate the property owner. This express
limitation imposes a heavy burden on property owners seeking redress for
loss incurred due to oppressive regulations.
The Glendale Court's holding is further limited by the Court's analysis in
Keystone. In order to justify an award of just compensation, a Court must
first find that a taking exists. Under Keystone, the Court will most likely
not find a taking where the regulation is imbued with a public purpose. The
Keystone Court's emphasis on the public purpose element and its emascu-
lation of the degree of interference factor create substantial obstacles for a
landowner who seeks to establish a taking. Application of the Keystone
analysis provides the courts with a method for avoiding the compensation
requirement. Although compensation is required upon the finding of a
taking, courts will rarely find a taking under the criteria the Court has
established.
D. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
In the same term as Glendale, the Court reviewed a second case which
presented the takings issue in a regulatory situation. In Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, the plaintiffs owned a parcel of beachfront property
in Ventura, California. 294 The Nollans decided to tear down a bungalow
which had fallen into disrepair and build a new structure on the property.
They applied for a coastal development permit as required by the California
Coastal Commission (the "Commission"). 95 The Commission granted the
building permit subject to the condition that the Nollans allow the portion
of their property bordering the ocean to be used as a public easement. 296
292. Id. at 2389 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416).
293. 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
294. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
295. Id. at 3143.
296. Id.
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The Commission reasoned that the new house would block the view of the
beach.297 Therefore, the Commission conditioned the construction permit on
the Nollans' grant of an easement, which would offset the public burden
the new building would create.29
The Nollans unsuccessfully attempted to have the condition waived through
the Commission's administrative procedures. 9 They brought an action in
the California Superior Court claiming the requirement of an easement
constituted a taking without compensation in violation of the fifth amend-
ment. The California Superior Court found for the plaintiffs on statutory
grounds. 00 The Commission appealed. The court of appeals held that the
condition was permissible because the easement requirement was "sufficiently
related to burdens created by the project to be constitutional" and that the
condition did not deprive the owners of all reasonable use of the property.310
However, the United States Supreme Court held that imposition of the
easement constituted an attempt by the Commission to take property without
providing just compensation. 02 The Court stated that if the government had
simply required the plaintiffs to grant a public easement, the requirement
would constitute a physical invasion and a taking which required compen-
sation.03 In this case, however, the grant was a condition to a building
permit, designed to offset the burden the new structure would create.310 The
Court framed the issues as whether the easement was a reasonable condition
to the land use permit and whether the condition was justified by a "public
interest." 05
The Nollan Court identified the public interest as psychological access to
the public beaches.3 0 ' The Court stated that the objective embodied in the
permit condition was a legitimate exercise of the Commission's police power.
The Court listed conditions which would logically serve the Commission's
objective, such as height and width restrictions on the new house or even a
viewing spot on the property for passers-by.30 These conditions could be
attached to the permit and would create no constitutional problems because
they would serve to alleviate the psychological barrier that the house would
erect.310 Here, however, the Court found no legitimate nexus between the
condition and the objective the Commission attempted to achieve.3 °9 The
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. The Commission found that the new house would block ocean view and create a
psychological barrier to the public beaches and the coastline. 107 S. Ct. at 3143-44.
300. Id. at 3144.
301. Id. (citing 177 Cal. App. 3d at 723).
302. Id. at 3150.
303. Id. at 3145.
304. 107 S. Ct. at 3146.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 3147.
307. Id. at 3147-48.
308. Id. at 3148.
309. 107 S. Ct. at 3149.
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Court stated that the requirement of lateral access across the plaintiffs'
property for people already on the beach would do nothing to alleviate the
psychological barrier to others not on the beach °10 The Court concluded
that the condition was an attempt by the Commission to acquire an easement
for public use and would not alleviate the "burdens" that the Nollans' new
house would create." 1 The Court suggested that the Commission exercise its
power of eminent domain to achieve its goal. 12
IV. IMPACT
A. Legal/Analytical
The Supreme Court's recent decisions demonstrate a shift in position from
one of extreme deference to state and local regulatory entities to one of
increased protection for the private property owner from destructive govern-
ment regulatory schemes. While this increased protection is extremely limited,
Glendale and Nollan nonetheless demonstrate the Court's attempt to shift
direction. In Glendale, the Court declared that if a government regulation
constitutes a taking of "all use" of an individual's property, compensation
is mandated from the time an ordinance is enacted. 3 This holding precludes
a regulatory entity from simply invalidating a regulation that is found to
constitute a taking. Glendale puts regulatory agencies on notice that courts
will provide legal protection for landowners and that the unchecked freedom
to regulate that these entities previously enjoyed has been somewhat dimin-
ished. In addition, Nollan's holding that a governmental entity's conditions
on a building permit must be more than rationally related to the public
benefit the condition is thought to promote, indicates that the Court is more
inclined to scrutinize a regulation's relationship to the alleged public purpose.
Incorporating the language from Keystone, that a regulation must substan-
tially advance the public purpose, Justice Scalia's opinion in Nollan adds
substance to this standard by warning that the Court will now carefully
scrutinize the government's preferred means of achieving its objective. 314
Glendale's compensation guarantee and Nollan's increased scrutiny suggest
that the Court is moving toward more serious protection of property rights.
However, a composite view of the three recent cases reveals that this move-
310. Id.
311. Id. at 3150.
312. Id.
313. Glendale, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
314. Justice Scalia stated:
[Olur cases describe the condition for abridgement of property rights through the
police power as a 'substantial advancing' of a legitimate State interest. We are
inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual conveyance
of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land use restriction, since in that
context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police power objective.
107 S. Ct. at 3150.
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ment is taking place within a narrow framework. Each of the three cases
raises questions as to the practical scope of the Court's approach.
The Keystone takings analysis is the most obvious restriction on a property
owner's ability to obtain monetary compensation pursuant to the just com-
pensation clause. The Keystone Court applied the takings analysis used in
Penn Central which resulted in substantial deference to the regulatory en-
tity.313 The determinative issue for the Penn Central Court was the public
benefit brought about through the regulations designed to preserve the
historic terminal. Similarly, the Keystone Court focused on the regulatory
purpose. The Pennsylvania Subsidence Act was enacted to promote the public
interest in environmental protection. The Court's finding of a public purpose
was sufficient to justify interference with property rights and preclude an
award of monetary compensation to the property owner. The Keystone case
indicates that the Court continues to tolerate a substantial degree of depri-
vation to a property owner provided that the government entity can articulate
a public purpose for the regulation. 3 6 This analysis draws on the substantive
due process analysis, results in deference to the regulating entity, and suggests
that the Court is unwilling to expand its view of what constitutes a taking
which requires compensation in the sphere of land use regulation.
The Nollan opinion requires a substantial nexus between the permit con-
dition and a legitimate public interest. This opinion provides a potential
glimmer of hope to property owners seeking compensatory relief from
oppressive regulation. If broadly construed, the Nollan case will require a
regulating entity to establish that its regulatory scheme achieves the articu-
lated objectives. The Court will no longer merely apply a cursory review.
Under the heightened scrutiny of Nollan, the government carries a greater
burden in order to salvage a challenged regulation. While this change in
approach is welcome, it does not cure all the defects in the Court's treatment
of oppressive regulations.
Even if Nollan is given its broadest interpretation, the taking analysis
employed by the Court will continue to result in substantial deference to the
regulating entity. Although the Court suggests that a more careful scrutiny
will be employed in reviewing the relationship of the means to the govern-
mental objective, the taking analysis employed by the Court still erects a
substantial obstacle to property owners seeking compensation. The Court
has not addressed the issue of what constitutes a legitimate public purpose.
Relevant case law indicates that even the weakest public objective justification
will satisfy the Court's scrutiny. Nollan is a case in point. The Court had
no difficulty accepting "psychological access to the beach" as a public
purpose sufficient to justify some sort of deprivation of property rights.31'
While the Court held that the government's acquisition of an easement along
315. See supra notes 250-74 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 256-65 and accompanying text.
317. 107 S. Ct. at 3149.
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the shoreline would not achieve the government's goal, the opinion indicated
that the appropriation of a viewing spot on the Nollan's property just
might 8 It appears that the Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny
to the means the government implemented to achieve its goal and little or
no scrutiny to the legitimacy of the government's objective.
If narrowly interpreted, the Nollan case could be construed as a physical
invasion case and would add little to the regulatory taking jurisprudence. 19
The Nollan case involved the government's attempt to acquire a legally
recognized and tangible property interest, an easement, from the property
owner. The regulations in Keystone and Glendale were different in that they
restricted the property owner's use of his property and made no attempt to
acquire a legally recognized and, more importantly, physical property interest
as in Nollan. The Nollan opinion referred to the concept of physical invasion
throughout the case, n° and its application could conceivably be limited to
cases in which the government entity attempts to physically appropriate a
parcel of property in order to achieve its objective.
The Court in Nollan stated that if the government had desired to take an
easement outright, as opposed to justifying the easement as a means to
alleviate a burden created by the property owner's intended structure, the
government would have been required to award compensation. 2' The Court
distinguished Nollan from a pure eminent domain action because the ease-
ment was a condition for the building permit and was designed to counter-
balance the adverse effects the new building would have on the public.3 "
However, it is the aspect of physical invasion which appears to be the Court's
main concern throughout the opinion. As a result, it is likely the holding
turned on the physical nature of the government's attempted interference.
If Nolian is interpreted in this way, it adds little to the takings issue, as the
Court has never demonstrated a reluctance to apply the inverse condemnation
remedy to cases involving physical invasion. Kaiser Aetna'3 and Causby 24
illustrate the Court's willingness to find a taking where the contested gov-
ernment regulation manifests itself in the form of physical interference with
property rights.
318. The Court noted that a "broad range of governmental purposes" satisfy the requirement
of a legitimate government interest and assumed "without deciding" that the "psychological
access" justification qualified. Id. at 3147-48.
319. While this article was being written the Supreme Court of North Dakota distinguished
Nollan on this basis. See Grand Forks-Trail Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d 344, 348
(S. Ct. N.D. 1987) (distinguishing Nollan on ground that Nollan involved a permanent physical
occupation while the instant case involved a true regulation).
320. 107 U.S. at 3145-48.
321. The Court first noted that the situation involved an attempt to obtain an easement on
petitioner's property. The Court stated that "California is free to advance its 'comprehensive
program,' if it wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for this 'public purpose' . . . but
if it wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it." Nollan, at 3150.
322. Id. at 3143.
323. See supra note 104.
324. See supra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
1989]
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
The Glendale Court further limited the Court's movement toward a greater
degree of protection for private property. In order to apply the Glendale
compensation requirement, a landowner must prove that a taking occurred
which deprived him of "all use" of his land125 This is an extremely heavy
burden for a property owner to satisfy. The Court will first apply the
Keystone/Nollan takings analysis and, if the regulation serves a legitimate
public purpose and substantially furthers that purpose, the inquiry will end.
However, even if no legitimate purpose exists, compensation may still be
denied if the landowner fails to demonstrate that the regulation has curtailed
all use of his property. Under this analysis, a landowner could conceivably
incur a substantial loss in the value of his property, and not be compensated
for this loss as long as he could put his property to "some" use.
B. Practical hnpact
The impact of these cases on the day-to-day functioning of government
regulatory entities and private property holders will be minimal. The recent
cases will unquestionably cause little consternation among government reg-
ulatory entities. Similarly, the practical impact will be less than might initially
be anticipated. While land use commissions will now be subject to liability
in situations which previously never implicated monetary compensation,
specifically, where a regulation deprives an owner of all use of his property,
the Court's analysis nonetheless fails to provide adequate protection for
property owners who have suffered less than total destruction of their
property interests. The Court's holdings should temper some of the most
destructive regulatory schemes. Nonetheless, given the limnited situations in
which government entities will be subject to liability, the Court's holdings
will effect neither the overwhelming majority of the regulatory schemes
currently in force nor those contemplated.
The Court has provided three loopholes for regulatory entities: 1) the
public purpose loophole; 2) the "all use" loophole; and, 3) the narrow range
of protected property rights loophole. Consequently, regulatory commissions
will generally have little trouble avoiding liability. The first loophole, the
public purpose justification, will uphold the regulation as long as the regu-
lation is found to promote some public purpose. Glendale suggested that the
existence of a public purpose could limit the application of its holding. In
the second loophole, the Court required total destruction of the property
owner's ability to make use of his property before compensation was awarded.
Thus, if property is subjected to a regulation which precluded the owner
from making use of the property in the manner he intended, no compensation
will be required as long as some use can be made of the property.
The third loophole is found in the fact that the Court's holdings protect
only a limited range of property rights. Physical possession has always been
325. 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
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protected. However, the Court seems unwilling to protect some of the less
tangible property rights in any meaningful way. Use, enjoyment, and expec-
tation interests have continually been excluded from the Court's protection.
Although the Court has indicated a willingness to protect against a total
destruction of use, many regulations which cause substantial impairment of
use and enjoyment will still withstand judicial scrutiny. The expectation
interest in property is not given serious protection as illustrated by Penn
Centra26 and Agins.n7 In both cases, the property owners were precluded
from using their property in the way that they had anticipated. In the face
of such limitations many property owners will be forced to sell the property.
Given the restrictions on the use to which the property may be put and the
history of intrusive regulation in the area, most prospective buyers will be
reluctant to invest. At the very least, the original owner will be forced to
adjust the selling price and absorb a loss as a result of the restriction.
Certainly, a government can never completely destroy a property owner's
ability to alienate his property without providing some sort of redress, but
the Court's analysis allows for situations where this right or ability can be
seriously impaired.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the protection provided
property owners is limited. The three loopholes the Court provides for
government entities also define the scope of risk a property owner must
assume relative to regulation. Given the limited range of property rights
which are protected, a property owner must assume the risk of severe
impairment of certain property interests. While the property owner's rights
of use and enjoyment are protected to a certain degree, he must incur a
total loss of use to invoke the compensation requirement. Finally, if the
government can provide a public purpose justification, the private property
owner may be required to suffer the burden of that regulation without
compensation.
C. Scholarly Critique
The judiciary has yet to develop a satisfactory definition of when govern-
ment action in the form of a regulation constitutes a taking. Many scholars
have commented on this issue and many judicial tests have been proposed. "8
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to provide a presentation of these
various works, but there are some central concerns which run through many
of these commentaries. The following section will examine two fundamental
problems with the Court's regulatory taking analysis in light of the concerns
identified by the commentators. 32 9
326. See supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 82-87 and accompanying text.
328. For an overview of the regulatory takings area and a discussion of proposed judicial
tests, see Stoebuck, supra note 57, at 1070-80.
329. See generally Berger, supra note 145; Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accom-
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The Court has consistently applied a limited notion of property rights in
its regulatory takings analysis. Traditionally, the Court found a taking only
where the government action resulted in a physical invasion of private
property.3 0 This restricted notion of property rights is wholly at odds with
the American legal concept of private property ownership. Private property
ownership is thought to encompass a bundle of rights. Included in the bundle
are the rights of use, management and possession. 33 It follows logically that
government interference with or modification of any of these rights could
constitute a taking. There is no basis for drawing a distinction between
government activity which interferes with property in a physical manner and
government activity which interferes with property rights in a less tangible
manner. A property owner's ability to use and enjoy his property can be
just as drastically impaired by a regulation as by physical interference. While
it is true that the Court's taking analysis has evolved and thus the Court
now recognizes that some types of non-physical interference may constitute
a taking,3 32 the Court has selected a few types of intrusion for special
protection while leaving the balance of these less tangible rights unprotected.
In the case of Penn Central, the Court reasoned that because the regulation
did not adversely affect the existing structures there was no taking.3" The
right to use the airspace and the right to develop the property were not
deemed worthy of protection. According to Richard Epstein, one of the
preeminent scholars in this area, "[tihe air rights over the existing building
were property just as much as the air rights already occupied by the existing
structure."
3 4
A second concern of the scholars is the Court's failure to develop a logical
distinction between the police power and eminent domain power. 35 The
Court's current criteria to determine whether a taking has occurred focuses
on the existence of a public purpose and the degree of interference the
regulation has engendered. 3 6
odation Power: Antidotes For The Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 CoLzU. L.
REv. 1021 (1975); Cunningham, supra note 57; Hagman, Compensable Regulation: A Way of
Dealing With Wipeouts From Land Use Controls?, 54 J. Ua.. L. 46 (1976); Mandelker, supra
note 180; Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Hasv. L. Rv. 1165 (1967); Oakes, supra note 18; Sax,
supra note 152; Stoebuck, supra note 57; Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power:
The Search For Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CA.. L. REv. 1 (1970).
330. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 1.
332. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
334. EPs'mrN, supra note 31, at 64.
335. It has been said of police power that: "the state takes property by eminent domain
because it is useful to the public, and under the police power because it is harmful .... From
this results the difference ... that the former recognises (sic) a right to compensation, while
the latter on principle does not." E. FRaND, THE POLICE Powmt 546-47 (1904).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 236-74.
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The "degree of interference" factor creates results inconsistent with those
produced by an eminent domain analysis. Where the government physically
invades property, compensation is mandated regardless of the extent of the
interference . 7 Partial physical takings trigger the compensation remedy in
the same manner as does the taking of an entire parcel.338 If the Constitution
protects even a small encroachment upon private property under a physical
invasion scenario, the Constitution should also protect a small encroachment
in a regulatory taking scenario. The Constitution has never distinguished
between proper and improper government conduct on the basis of the extent
of interference.
The fifth amendment, as applied to the government's exercise of its eminent
domain power, incorporates two components.3 39 The government may take
a private property interest only where it is justified by a public purpose and
then only if it awards just compensation to the property owner for his
deprivation. Under the Supreme Court's regulatory taking analysis, the
existence of a public purpose serves to validate the regulation, as a public
purpose validates a taking. However, under the regulatory taking analysis,
this finding of a public purpose allows the government to avoid rather than
award compensation. 0
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent trio of cases demonstrate the Court's desire
to provide more protection for private property rights in the face of land
use regulation. However, the Court's taking analysis fails to focus adequately
on the underlying policies of the fifth amendment. The amendment explicitly
states that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." The Constitution does not distinguish between government
action which physically interferes with property rights and government action
which interferes with property in a less tangible way. Similarly, the Consti-
tution does not condition the award of compensation on the degree of
interference. The Constitution does, however, indicate that the taking of
property for a public use will trigger the requirement of compensation. The
language of the amendment suggests that government action which affir-
matively benefits the public requires the government to compensate the
property owner. The private individual should not be required to bear solely
the burden of the public benefit.
Land use regulation is necessary in a society whose population and in-
dustrial centers are constantly shifting. As the lines between industrial and
337. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
338. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (just compensation
awarded for temporary occupation of plaintiff's warehouse); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.
369 (1943) (calculation of just compensation for partial taking).
339. See supra note 58.
340. 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2378 (1987).
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residential areas are constantly being redrawn, the government must work
to accommodate and balance the competing interests of the various societal
groups. It is undisputed that the government needs a certain amount of
flexibility to reach this goal. However, as regulation increases, the equitable
distribution of the burdens these regulations create becomes imperative. The
Court's recent holdings recognize and attempt to deal with this problem by
requiring redress in the worst case scenarios. However, the majority of cases
fall outside the worst case scenario realm and are, therefore, not addressed.
These are the cases on which the legal scholars and the judiciary should
focus in their attempts to develop an analysis which will provide for a more
equitable distribution of the burden of land use regulation. Perhaps the most
significant aspect of the Court's recent holdings is the apparent willingness
of the Court to finally address and deal with the problem of destructive land
use regulation in a realistic manner. These holdings suggest that the Court
is willing to scrutinize land use regulation more closely and might be willing
to expand its protection for private property owners faced with destructive
regulation.
Anne R. Pramaggiore
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